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NARRATIVE AND CLIENT-CENTERED
REPRESENTATION: WHAT IS A TRUE
BELIEVER TO DO WHEN HIS TWO
FAVORITE THEORIES COLLIDE?
JOHN B. MITCHELL*
By nature I am a somewhat skeptical person. I do not trust much
of what is in the papers, except perhaps the box scores contained in
the sports section. Nor am I tempted to send away $19.95 plus ship-
ping and handling for some cream which, when rubbed over the sur-
face of my faded and rust-pitted car, is promised to magically restore
the paint to its original condition. Yet when it comes to theories of
Narrative and Client-Centered Representation, I believe with all my
heart and soul.' In fact, it is probably fair to say that these theories
provide the two main guideposts for my clinical teaching.
(1) An affinity for narrative
Take narrative. How could I not believe? You don't have to con-
vince me that narrative-storytelling--is our most basic form of com-
munication 2 and the primary lens through which we understand day to
* Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Seattle University for the grant supporting this essay, Albert Moore and Chris Rideout for
their many helpful suggestions and insights, and Nancy Ammons, Liz Dorsett, Darla Sim-
mons, and Brenda Murray for their editorial suggestions and word-processing skills.
1 Some time after I'd submitted this article to the Clinical Law Review, Volume 5 of
that publication appeared in my mailbox. And there was Professor Kotkin's article-
Minna J. Kotkin, Creating True Believers: Putting Macro Theory Into Practice, 5 CLIN. L.
REv. 95 (1998). In over fifteen years teaching law, I truly believe that I have never seen
the phrase "true believer" in the title of a law review article, and now (counting mine)
there were two in less than a year, and both in the same journal. What could it mean?
Suffice to say I immediately read Professor Kotkin's article (as any true believer would). It
is a very thoughtful piece, challenging clinical teachers to explicitly bring large (macro)
theory into their teaching. Interesting, though the focus of our two articles are very differ-
ent, both Professor Kotkin and myself use the phrase "true believer" in the same sense,
with even the same basic underlying macrotheories (i.e. narrative and critical lawyering
theory). What could this mean?
2 "It is useful to remind ourselves that narrative is the earliest and most enduring form
of substantial human communication." David 0. Friedrichs, Narrative Jurisprudence and
Other Heresies: Legal Education at the Margin, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 4 (1990). See also
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Telling Stories And Stories About Them, 1 CLIN. L. REv. 9, 11
(1994); John Batt, Law, Science, and Narrative: Reflections on Brain Science, Electronic
Media, Story, and Law Learning, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 19, 25 (1990); Teresa Goodwin
Phelps, Narratives of Disobedience: Breaking/Changing the Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 8, 8
(1990); Russ M. HERMAN, COURTROOM PERSUASION: WINNING wrni ART, DRAMA, AND
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day human experience. 3 I live in the world, experience it, and fill my
days telling and listening to stories large and small.4 In my spare time,
I read books, watch T.V., go to movies-stories, stories, stories.5
While I recognize that narrative theory has become a trendy, post-
modern buzz word, my interest in the concept has far more mundane
roots. I always loved stories. Hearing them. Telling them. 6 When life
did not go well on any particular day of my preschool youth, I would
reimagine the situation so that it would turn out well. In the process, I
became acutely aware of the possible alternative narratives which situ-
ations contained.
As I grew older, I continued my love of stories and became aware
that people were constantly constructing stories to make sense of their
experiences, not necessarily stories that rivaled great literature or
drama, but stories nonetheless. And they used stories to make norma-
tive decisions, selecting among competing stories, judging the credibil-
ity of a particular story by comparing it to their own stock of tales, or
using a story to justify a decision.7 Sometimes their stories appeared
to be so simple that they hardly seemed stories at all, yet upon exami-
nation, they were stories through and through.
For example, imagine the following dialogue: "You know that
SCIENCE 214-19 (1997) [hereinafter "Persuasion"]; Russ M. Herman, Telling The Story:
Devices And Techniques, 23 TR. LAWYERS Q. 47, 47-48 (Summer, 1993) [hereinafter "De-
vices"]; Gerry Spence, Let Me Tell You A Story, 31 TRIAL 72, 73 (February, 1995).
3 JEROME BRUNER, AcruAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 16, 89-90 (1986); James Boyd
White, Telling Stories In The Law And In Ordinary Life-The Orestia And 'Noon Wine'
Chapter 8, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 169
(1985) ("The story is the most basic way we have of organizing our experience and claim-
ing meaning for it"); Albert J. Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom,
37 UCLA L. REV. 273, 291-92 (1989) ("According to Bruner, the narrative mode of
thought is used to interpret stories about human intentions and the nature of human affairs
[footnote omitted]").
4 One author persuasively claims that the human brain is hard wired for narrative. See
John Batt, supra note 2, at 43.
5 I'm hardly alone in embracing narrative. See, e.g., Lawyers As Storytellers & Story-
tellers As Lawyers: An Interdisciplinary Symposium Exploring the Use of Storytelling in the
Practice of Law, 18 VT. L. REV. 567 (1994) [hereinafter "Lawyers As Storytellers"];
Pedagogy of Narratives: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990); Symposium: Legal
Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989); James Elkins, A Bibliography of Narrative, 40
J. LEGAL EDUC. 203 (1990). In fact the first three articles (out of seven) in the inaugural
publication of the Clinical Law Journal all concerned narrative-Amsterdam, supra note 2;
Nancy Cook. Legal Fictions: Clinical Experiences, Lace Collars and Boundless Stories, 1
CLIN. L. REV. 41 (1994); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Clinic Runs Through It, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 65
(1994).
6 See James Boyd White, supra note 3, at 169 ("One fundamental characteristic of
human life is that we all tell stories, all the time, about ourselves and others, both in the
law and out of it.").
7 In fact, across cultures, nations, and time, societies' notions of fairness and justice
have been embedded in narratives, folktales. For the Aesop Award winning collection of
such stories, see SHARON CREEDON, FAIR IS FAIR: WORLD FOLKTALES OF JUSTICE (1994).
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you were supposed to put away the dishes before you went out last
night. You didn't, and so you're not going out tonight." Hearing this
encounter, we immediately have an interpretation of what is going on.
Our schemata8 triggered by this information would probably fill in a
parent and child, the latter likely a teenager who is perhaps about to
go out using one of the family's cars. But do we see this as involving a
story? On its surface, this appears to be a rule (you must put away the
dishes before you leave), a violation (you didn't), and a punishment
(you can't go out tonight). But I believe that this is deceptive. Embed-
ded within this seeming judicial-like pronouncement are likely a
number of stories which give the parent's decision moral authority
and meaning-stories about the particular family and their expecta-
tions of shared responsibility, archetypal cultural stories about the
duty of children to their parents and the rights of parents to exact
discipline, stories about previous occasions in which this child was
given a break when she failed to carry out some responsibility, stories
about other siblings who feel this one is favored and does not have to
do a fair share of the work, stories about how a parent had an exhaust-
ing, frustrating day at work and came home only to find the dishes
lying around, etc. So, seeing life as "competing narratives" came nat-
urally to me, although I never would have put it that way in my pre-
academic existence.
The claim that lawyers are always telling stories in and out of
court9 is equally unexceptional to me. I practice law, so I know. As
for lawyers telling stories at trial10-- at least if they're good law-
8 For a discussion of schema, see infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
9 "Lawyers are by profession storytellers." James R. Elkins, Pedagogy of Narrative: A
Symposium, 40 L. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1990). See also Douglas Maynard, Narratives and
Narrative Structure in Plea Bargaining in NARRATrvE AND THE LEGAL DISCOURSE-A
READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW, 125 (David Paple ed., 1988) (negotiations
bound by specific narrative structures); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recog-
nizing Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REv. 485, 485 (1994) ("As a practical
matter, lawyers have always seen their work as in part storytelling,...."); White, supra
note 3, at 174 ("...it is plain that narrative is central to the intellectual activity of the
lawyer...").
10 As Professor Abrams states:
For the trial attorney, "law" is inevitably about presenting concrete and nonlinear
stories, about sensing the features of a narrative that will engage a judge's or juror's
attention or expose the tension in a legal rule. Using and telling clients' stories re-
quires trial lawyers to make constant assessments of what they mean, of what ele-
ments unite them, of which features are most important.
Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1043 (1991); see also
Thomas Shaffer & James Elkins, Solving Problems and Telling Stories, in NARRATIVE AND
THE LEGAL DISCOURSE-A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW 90, 98-99 (David
Papke ed., 1989) (examining Gerald L6pez' conception of a lawyer's job as storyteller);
Kathryn Holmes Snedaker, Storytelling in Opening Statements: Framing the Argumentation
at Trial, 10 Am. J. TRIAL ADV. 15 (1986) (examining the communicative features of the
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yers1"-what else is trial but a story, 12 in fact a work of fiction' 3 com-
plete with dramatic plots' 4 and archetypal themes?' 5 Look in a
courtroom during trial. All that exists in that courtroom (save some
visuals, and those are just like illustrations in a book) are words from
which a tale is woven. No one in that calm courtroom is being ex-
posed to asbestos, being robbed at gun point, or breaking a limb in a
shattering car accident. All that already happened. This is just the
story.16 In fact, I so believe this that I use a narrative model to de-
velop trial strategy when preparing my clinic students for trial in crim-
inal cases.
As for the more academic views of narrative, I'm likewise a com-
plete believer. It makes complete sense to me that our legal texts
float in a sea of varied and often conflicting cultural and historical
opening statement); Gerry Spence, How to Make a Complex Case Come Alive for the Jury,
A.B.A.J., Apr. 1986, at 62 (comparing law's use of narrative to storytelling).
11 There is widespread belief among expert practitioners that the quality of the trial
attorney's narrative presentation will consistently mark the difference between winning
and losing. See, e.g., David D. Gross, Ph.D., Winning Narratives in Courtroom Rhetoric:
Blending Stories and the 'Evidence' in Closing Argument, 19 TRIAL DIPLOMACY J. 331
(1996); Herman, Devices, supra note 2; HERMAN, PERSUASION, supra note 2; JoHN D.
Mooy, ADVOCACY AND THrE Acr OF STORYTELLING (1990) (audiocassette with text);
Murray Ogborn, Storytelling Throughout Trial-Increasing Your Persuasive Powers, 31
TRIAL 63 (August 1995); Spence, supra note 2. For an insightful exploration of telling
erstwhile politically incorrect narratives in defense of one's client, see Eva Nilsen, The
Criminal Defense Lawyer's Reliance on Bias and Prejudice, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1
(1994).
12 "It has long been recognized that storytelling is at the heart of the trial." Philip N.
Meyer, Introduction - Will You Be Quiet, Please? Lawyers Listening To The Call of Stories
in Lawyers As Storytellers, supra note 5, at 567. See also Steven Lubet, The Trial as a
Persuasive Story, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 77 (1990); White, supra note 3, at 186.
13 "It [the trial] is always fictional." White, supra note 3, at 186.
14 See Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Argument to a
Jury, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REv. 55, 64, 75 (1992). ("But if the defense argument is viewed as
a tale with the jury as protagonist and the courtroom as its setting, it has not only a coher-
ent narrative structure and almost classic narrative theme [of the "Hero"] ..... Because
the subject of defense counsel's argument is the trial in 1991, its form of narrative is the
Drama.").
15 Thus, e.g., a prosecutor counters the lack of motive for a killing by drawing upon the
stories of the "mad dog" killer who will kill for some invisible slight, Amsterdam & Hertz,
supra note 14 at 37, while the trial in the Chicago Anarchists Trial of 1886 (the so called
Haymarket Riots) turns upon an unspoken tale of a society in corruption for which a
scapegoat must be found to purge the decay, Kathryn Holmes Snedaker, supra note 10, at
43-44.
16 Professor White makes a similar observation:
What can the jury, sitting there in a high-ceilinged room on a summer afternoon,
ever know about what it was like, for either side, that day on the highway when
disaster struck without warning, or when in the chicken yard the farmer hit the stran-
ger with an axe? At best, the juror can only decide whom to believe.
White, supra note 3, at 186; see also Kim Lane Scheppele, Forward: Telling Stories, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2073, 2082 (1989) ("Judges and Jurors are not witnesses to the events at
issue; they are witnesses to the stories .... ").
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narratives from which their ultimate meaning is derived. 17 I've long
since believed that you can't have meaning outside of context, 18 and
that narrative provides the context for our law words. 19
In fact, I accept that the very notion of law is grounded upon a
story-i.e., law is necessary for social order 2 0-and that law itself is a
story, a story of a path or bridge from this imperfect world to one
fairer and more secure.21 It's the yellow brick road to Oz, and I so
completely believe that path is there that every year I eagerly try to
guide new students down it. Even when I try to expose students to the
increasing variety of legal theories, I now see stories; for underlying
this variety of jurisprudential frames are narratives, 22 which some
17 "No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning." Robert J. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Fore-
word: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 4 (1983) (footnote omitted). See also id.
at 5, 17.
18 I have a great deal of company, and good and illustrious company at that, in this
belief. See, e.g., Thomas D. Eisele, Wittgenstein's Instructive Narratives: Leaving the Les-
son Latent, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 77, 85 (1990); Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 35 (1993) ("At the core of antifoundationalism is an epistemology
that denies any foundation to knowledge; but antifoundationalism is assumed to be
prefigured by socially and culturally produced thoughts and propositions about
knowledge.").
19 "Law, like every discipline and profession, is constituted by its stories." James R.
Elkins, From the Symposium Editor" in Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 1 (1990). See also Cover, supra note 17. Thus, underlying the reasoning in legal
decisions may be such foundational cultural stories as, e.g., the debtor in bankruptcy who
seeks a fresh start in life, David Ray Papke, Discharge as Denouement: Appreciating the
Storytelling of Appellate Opinions, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 145, 49 (1990); the arms length
bargainer in a contract negotiation between two parties of equal power, id. at 156; Kellye
Y. Testy, Reconsidering Grant Gilmore's The Death of Contract-An Unlikely Resurrec-
tion, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 219, 222 (1995); the "redemptive" narratives of struggles against
religious and racial oppression, Cover, supra note 17, at 65; or the "male head of house-
hold" which provided a dominant narrative in the structure of public benefits programs,
Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemploy-
ment Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 108 (1992).
20 See, e.g., Elkins, supra note 9, at 1 ("One mythic story of law speaks of law as funda-
mental to a social and ordered life."). See also White, supra note 3, at 176 (author dis-
cusses how the Greek tragedy The Oresteia celebrates the movement from the primitive
world of unending feud to one in which disputes and grievances are brought to finality by
the order of law).
21 See Robert M. Cover, Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REv.
179, 181 (1985) ("Law, I argued, is a bridge in normative space connecting... 'the world
that is' with our projections of alternative 'worlds-that-might-be'...."); Ekins, supra note
9, at 2 ("Law is one of the crafted fictions of modern life that helps us navigate the perilous
movement from the reality of the world we have made with law to an imagined world that
law makes possible.").
22 Thus, e.g., underlying the current movement towards civic republicanism and com-
munitarianism are utopian stories of a world in which a virtuous citizenry puts aside their
personal desires in order to foster the goals of the broader community, goals set by rich
public participation and discussion. See generally John D. Ayer, Essay Review-Narrative
in the Moral Theology of Thomas Shaffer, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 173, 90 (1985) ("For one
thing, Communitarianism always includes a fairly large dose of utopian vision."); Peter
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credibly claim even fall within recognized literary categories. 23
Narrative, however, does not come without a price. I believe as
completely that there is a narrative darkside. When people say that
there is no such thing as neutral, objective values24 because we con-
struct meaning from our own understandings, 25 biases, needs,
Margulies, The Mother With Poor Judgment And Other Tales Of The Unexpected: A Civic
Republican View Of Difference And Clinical Legal Education, 88 Nw. L. REV. 695, 696-97
(1994); Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue And The Feminine Voice In Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 547, 551 (1986). Similarly, Law and Economics assumes the
classic story of the free-market, filled with equally informed and powerful transactors. See,
e.g., Gary Minda, supra note 18, at 38; Pierre Schlag An Appreciative Comment on Coase's
The Problem of Social Cost: A View From The Left, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 919 (1986); The
Problem of Transaction Costs, 62 CAL. L. REV. 1661 (1989).
23 "The Article argues that the narrative plots, protagonists, and images of major legal
theories do, in fact, fall into recognizable literary categories [composed of combinations of
romantic and ironic story modes, and comic and tragic world views]." Robin West, Juris-
prudence as Narrative: An Aesthetic Analysis of Modern Legal Theory, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
145, 146-47 (1985).
24 Professor Richard Delgado provides an excellent illustration of this notion which hits
close to home when he discusses the application of "neutral, objective" criteria in a hypo-
thetical law school tenure hiring decision in which the faculty (regretfully) chooses not to
hire a minority candidate. "No one raises the possibility that the merit criteria' employed in
judging Henry are themselves debatable, chosen-not inevitable. No one, least of all
Vernier, calls attention to the way in which merit functions to conceal the contingent con-
nection between institutional power and the things rated." Storytelling For Oppositionists
And Others: A Plea For Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2421 (1989). Accord Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on Woman's Lawyering Process,
1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 44 (1985). See also Christopher P. Gilkerson, Poverty Law
Narrative: The Critical Practice and Theory of Receiving and Translating Client Stories, 43
HASTINGS L.J. 861, 874 (1992) ("They [Feminists] inquire into the ways in which legal
discourse turns explanations posited by the powerful into purportedly objective doctrines
encompassing everyone."). In fact, the very notion of "objectivity" is itself value laden.
See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda For
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 541 (1982); Robin West, Love, Rage and Legal Theory, 1 YALE J. L.
& FEMINISM 101, 103 (1989); Laura Gardner Webster, Telling Stories: The Spoken Narra-
tive Tradition in Criminal Defense Discourse, 42 MERCER L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1991).
25 Social theorists have long known that people differently situated in the social world
come to see events in quite distinct and distinctive ways. How people interpret what
they see (or what people see in the first place) depends to a very large extent on
prior experiences, on the ways in which people have organized their own sense-mak-
ing and observation, on the patterns that have emerged in the past for them as mean-
ingful in living daily life. And so it should not be surprising that people with
systematically different sorts of experiences should come to see the world in system-
atically different ways.
Scheppele, supra note 16, at 2082 (footnote omitted). See also P. BERGER & T. LUCKMAN,
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY (1966); Delgado, supra note 24, at 2416 ("My
premise is that much of social reality is constructed. We decide what is, and, almost simul-
taneously, what ought to be. Narrative habits, patterns of seeing, shape what we see and
that to which we aspire.").
For an application of this concept to the interpretation of texts and argumentation, see
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRAC-
TICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989); Is THERE A TEXT IN TnS
CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
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scripts,2 6 stock stories,27 experience, culture, etc., I nod in unquestion-
ing agreement. It makes sense to me because it exactly reflects what I
see in the world. Even when I believed that I was modern and never
even knew there was such a thing as post-modern, I thought that. So
from there I have no trouble believing that laws that superficially ap-
pear neutral are often only so because they are structured around em-
bedded stories which justify the outcome-outcomes which favor
those who have the power to dictate the defining narratives. 28 When
26 "Scripts" are stereotyped or prototype event sequences., Amsterdam & Hertz, supra
note 14, at 114 n.146 ("In the terminology of Shank and Ableson, a script is a stereotyped
sequence of events which is familiar to an individual in a culture and guides his or her
experience."); Moore, Cognitive Filters, supra note 3, at 282 ("The typical event sequences
involved in going to a restaurant and ordering food are an example of such a script.");
Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: What We Talk About When We Talk About Law,
37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 38 (1992).
In this book, Tell Me a Story, Roger Schank tells us that experience lets us know how
to act and how others will act in given stereotypical situations. That knowledge is
called a script. Taken as a strong hypothesis about the nature of human thought, a
script obviates the need to think; no matter what the situation, people may use no
more thought than what is required to apply a script. Schank's hypothesis holds that
everything is a script and that very little thought is spontaneous.
Murray Ogborn, Storytelling Throughout Trial-Increasing Your Persuasive Powers, 31
TRIAL 63, 64 (August, 1995).
27 In his article, Gerald L6pez, who appears to have coined the phrase "stock story,"
explains "[t]he knowledge structures I have labeled 'stock stories' have been variously de-
scribed as 'scripts,' 'schemas,' 'frames,' and 'nuclear scenes.' I make no effort in this essay
to distinguish between the various usages." Gerald P. L6pez, Lay Lawyering, 32 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 3 n.1 (1984). See infra notes 86-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of
schema. Applying this concept as a tool of persuasion, L6pez states:
Human beings think about social interaction in story form. We see and understand
the world through "stock stories." These stories help us interpret the everyday world
with limited information and help us make choices about asserting our own needs
and responding to other people. These stock stories embody our deepest human,
social and political values. At the same time, they help us carry out the routine
activities of life without constantly having to analyze or question what we are doing.
When we face choices in life, stock stories help us understand and decide; they also
may disguise and distort. To solve a problem through persuasion of another we there-
fore must understand and manipulate the stock stories the other person uses in order to
tell a plausible and compelling story-one that moves that person to grant the remedy
we want.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added) [footnote omitted]. Accord John B. Mitchell, Redefining the Sixth
Amendment, 67 So. CAL. L. REV. 1215, 1332 (1994) [hereinafter, "Sixth Amendment"].
For discussion of the negative side of stock stories as a limitation on our powers of story
creation and interpretation, see James R. Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40
J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 62 (1990); Margulies, supra note 22, at 709.
28 The story of law in the United States is largely a story about one group of people,
upper class white male ... making law for all others in society. . . . [F]eminism has
asked us to question everything as we recognize that what we know has largely been
imposed on us as 'truth' by a particular class of truth creators and interpreters. [foot-
note omitted]
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New
Voices in Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 29, 43 (1987). Thus, e.g., feminist scholars viewed
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you read countless numbers of cases and spend a significant amount of
time practicing in our courts, it's not hard to see that the stories of
those without power are excluded from consideration when law is cre-
ated.29 And if by some chance their stories should ever be raised in
court, they are either totally discounted 30 or, even if given lip service,
the narratives underlying traditional contract law as being created from a male perspective,
biasing the law towards men and against women. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, On Being
The Object of Property, 14 SIGNS 8 (1988).
The feminist critique of contract has been sparse but acute. That is, feminist legal
theorists either have been sharply critical of contract ideology or have ignored the
institution altogether. Consistent with the central task of feminist legal theory, which
is to expose male norms imbedded in the law as universal and immutable, feminist
writers have criticized contract's emphasis on the bargain model of exchange. Find-
ing the bargain model suspect because it presupposes norms of equality (of bargain-
ing power) and freedom (to choose whether to contract), both of which have been
denied to women, feminist writers have critiqued contract as a perpetrator of oppres-
sion. Contract's role in fueling a market-based economy has rendered it suspect in
feminists' eyes as well, garnering it criticism for encouraging unadulterated self-inter-
est and commodification. [footnote omitted.]
Testy, supra note 19, at 222.
29 "The dominant group enjoys a privileged and highly advantageous position. Those
in this group have the power to shape the world and promote their interests by creating a
body of language and knowledge, and a system of beliefs that 'lock out' minority groups."
Benita Ramsey, Symposium-Excluded Voices: Realities In Law And Law Reform-Intro-
duction, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1987). See also Abrams, supra note 10, at 1033 ("...
'excluded voices' narratives: they offer the stories of women who were victims of some
gender-specific injury, whose voice had not been heard in social discussions of a problem,
or in legal discussion of the proper remedial response."); Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 878
("Universalized narratives of women in the family 'form underneath' and act as a founda-
tion for legal doctrine and rules pertaining to family law, employment, property, com-
merce, education, and welfare, while defining and reinforcing social functions and
experiences [footnote omitted]."); Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of
Feminism and Clinical Education, 75 MirmNN. L. REv. 1599, 1634 (1991) ("Exclusion ques-
tions help feminists develop structural theory from the narratives of experience explored in
consciousness-raising. Asking such questions entails asking about the exclusion of various
women's needs, perspectives, and experiences from law itself or from other social and
political institutions."). These "others" stories even have been excluded from our legal
classrooms and texts. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice:
Learning Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L. J. 2107, 2132 n.89 (1991); Susan
Bisom-Rapp, Contextualizing the Debate: How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can
Inform the Teaching of Employment Discrimination Law, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 366, 366 nn.
1-2 (1994). In fact, we don't even allow real clients to emerge in our class discussions,
limiting the analytic focus to a constructed client with no racial, ethnic, gender, cultural, or
political attributes. See Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client Within Legal Education,
44 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1733-34 (1993). Cf. also Paula Lustbader, Teach in Context: Re-
sponding to Diverse Student Voices Helps All Students Learn, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 402, 405-
07 (1998) (In discussing how to help students "relate" their learning, i.e., help them con-
nect what they are learning to what they already know, the author suggests inserting
friends and family members of the students' into hypotheticals, thereby making the client
and situation "real.").
30 Even with the demise of archaic laws which had held that women and people of color
were not competent to testify in court in circumstances which might affect the interests of
those in power, Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
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will generally lose to the stories of those with the law defining
power.31
A belief in the full implication of the darkside of narrative theory
in fact takes one even further. In real life practice, those groups with-
out power have to tell belittling and demeaning stories about them-
selves (stories that as individuals they often know to be untrue) 32 in
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1990), views of outsiders,
Le., those without power, are still nevertheless discounted in legal argumentation in a
number of ways. First, what they say may be defined as "irrelevant." As such they will be
legally, if not actually, silenced. About this, Professor Scheppele makes the following in-
sightful observation:
If the objectivist view is not point-of-viewless, then is the account it privileges still
worth the reverence the law accords it? A great deal depends on just what the ob-
server's point of view includes and excludes and what consequences such a view has.
If the objectivist account is one point of view among many (and not point-of-viewless
as against other point-of-viewful accounts), then one needs some other account ex-
plaining why it should be privileged, if indeed it is to be. One might begin such an
account by saying that the objectivist view includes those things that should be in-
cluded and excludes those things that should have no bearing on the legal outcome.
And here is where the fate of the stories of outsiders might be considered relevant to
a discussion of the point of view the law should take. If objectivist accounts system-
atically leave out the stories of outsiders and those stories should be considered, then
perhaps objectivist accounts should not be privileged.
Scheppele, supra note 16, at 1091. Second, the very way in which the less powerful tell
their stories may lead to being discounted. Studies in small claims court suggest that
speaking in an informal, narrative manner emphasizing relationships, as opposed to a for-
malistic rule-based manner, will likely lead to losing regardless of the merits. William M.
O'Barr and John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims
Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 661 (1985). Significantly, socially powerless
speakers tend to structure their testimony employing this narrative, relational logic. See
also White, supra at 17. Additionally, studies indicate that those in traditionally less pow-
erful positions use a speech syntax which gives their assertions less authority, Robin
Lakoff, LANGUAGE AND WOMEN'S PLACE (1975); White, supra at 14-15, including in the
courtroom, see, e.g., E. Allan Lind & William H. O'Barr, The Social Significance of Speech
in the Courtroom in LANGUAGE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (H. Giles & R. St. Clair eds., 1979).
For an excellent discussion of the effect of "women's speech" in the criminal procedure
context, see Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in
Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L. J. 259 (1993).
31 Professor Scheppele captures the notion that certain stories are given the power to
"trump" or be "privileged" over others:
It is the implicit contrast between those whose self-believed stories are officially ap-
proved, accepted, transformed into fact, and those whose self-believed stories are
officially distrusted, rejected, found to be untrue, or perhaps not heard at all. Those
whose stories are believed have the power to create fact; those whose stories are not
believed live in a legally sanctioned "reality" that does not match their perceptions.
"We," the insiders, are those whose versions count as facts; "they," the outsiders, are
those whose versions are discredited....
Scheppele, supra note 16, at 2070. Cf also Minda, supra note 18, at 42 ("The goal of this
[CLS] work was to demonstrate how legal interpretations of legal texts can privilege one
meaning over other possible meanings.").
32 Although legal narratives influence and shape behavior, they often ring false when
applied to individuals and groups about whom the narratives are supposedly told.
Contradictions arise when universalized narratives oppose or reduce real experience.
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order to be successful in a legal system where "victim,' ' 33 "learned
helplessness," 34 "needy with hand held out," 35 and "dependent and
powerless" 36 are the square pegs that fit into the square boxes of com-
fortably available legal categories and conceptions. At the same time,
in the appellate arena, the decisions of judges in cases involving race,
gender, or sexual conduct have historically been servants to one-sided,
and frequently offensive, narratives-Asians are an all but separate
species whom no white man could trust;37 blacks are a "subordinate
and inferior class of beings" and at times even become "property;
38
the natural role of women is to keep the home, as her temperament is
too weak and volatile for the professional workplace; 39 men lack the
For example, in bringing any type of sex-based claim, whether civil or criminal, a
woman is required to represent herself in a way that may contradict her experience. To
demonstrate harm and win relief, she must recount her ordeal and oppression by
fitting her story within a legal narrative of "victim." The narrative imposes the costs
of a further loss of individual power and self-esteem and compounds the trauma.
Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 875 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 While battered women may be anything but helpless, rather being involved in com-
plex strategies over power and control, Abrams, supra note 10, at 988-89, the legal identity
they are forced to adopt is otherwise.
In particular, cultural images of battered women have both informed and been
shaped by a small group of highly publicized, highly charged cases in which women
accused of killing their batterers assert a claim of self-defense. The expert testimony
on "learned helplessness, " which has been critical to women's victories on such claims,
has contributed to an image of battered women as pathologically weak, that is, too
helpless or dysfunctional to pursue a "reasonable course of action." This image has
disserved battered women in other legal contexts, such as child custody, and hindered
social response to the problem.
Abrams, supra note 10, at 988 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
35 Refusing to accept this self-description, in spite of the perspective of both the welfare
system and her own attorney, is at the core of Mrs. G's now-classic stance in White, supra
note 30.
36 According to Professor Alfieri, poverty lawyers and the poverty law system
subordinate and silence clients by casting them as dependent and powerless, rather than
seeing them as people with dignity who are connected to a variety of communities. See
Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4. GEO. J. LEGAL
ETmics 619 (1991).
37 See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854) (court characterized Chinese as a "distinct peo-
ple... whose mendacity is proverbial, a race of people whom nature has marked as inferior,
and who are incapable of progress or intellectual development beyond a certain point
38 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). These, moreover, are not
stories which died after the civil war, a century and a half ago. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, AND
WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); Delgado, supra note 24, at 2411 nn.10, 11. For a powerful
account of how blacks are socially "punished" if they really try to set the story straight, see
Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 127 (1987).
39 Thus, e.g., the following language appears in the concurrence of a United States
Supreme Court decision which refuses to keep a state from barring women from the prac-
tice of law:
The nature and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evi-
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child nurturing qualities of women;40 the workplace can be properly
divided into pregnant and non-pregnant people rather than be seen as
divided between those who can procreate (private life) without jeop-
ardizing their job (public life) and those who cannot;41 young women
are totally vulnerable and helpless in the face of young men who seek
to undermine their chastity while leaving the young women alone with
the consequences of pregnancy; 42 and on and on.
To counter this darkside of narrative, I also believe in narrative's
redeeming, self-correcting force. Stories make us understand the
dently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the fam-
ily organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of
things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain
and functions of womanhood .. ,
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). See also
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (can limit right of women to contract for more than
10 hours a day of work because of the "inherent differences between the two sexes."). See
also Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 877:
Legal narratives of family and work are premised on two seemingly fundamental
principles: (1) there is a normal or natural division of labor based on gender in both
the workplace and the family; and (2) family roles are private while employment
sector roles are public. Concepts of gender and the distinction between private and
public privatize women's family responsibilities and devalue the work women do in
the marketplace.
Sometimes the dynamics of these stories about women and work are quite complex. Con-
servative narratives say that "women are not interested in blue-collar work because it is
dirty and requires physical strength .... " Bisom-Rapp, supra note 29, at 385, while liberal
narratives speak of stereotyping and coercion, id. In fact, sociological research indicates
that the reality is far more complex-"In this view, sex segregation is a phenomenon fueled
by institutional structures, workplace social relations, and occupational cultures that pre-
vent women from desiring or succeeding in non-traditional jobs." Id. For an extremely
thorough and thoughtful analysis of this insight, see Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women And Work: Judicial Interpretations Of Sex Segregation In The Workplace In Title
VII Cases Raising The Lack Of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1799-1839
(1990).
40 Only recently was this particular story rejected. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (court struck down law which gave unwed mothers, but not unwed
fathers the power to unilaterally block adoption of their children by simply withholding
consent noting-"[We reject the assumption that fathers are] invariably less qualified and
entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their children"). Cf.
also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating state law that authorized court to impose
alimony responsibilities only on men); Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (strik-
ing down provision of Social Security Act awarding survival benefits to widows, but not
widowers).
41 See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (California could constitutionally
exclude pregnancy from disability coverage because it does not discriminate against
women but rather distinguishes between pregnant women and non-pregnant people [com-
prised of men and women]). For extensive citations regarding the fictive public-private
distinction, see, Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 877-78 nn.54-58.
42 This is a story which persists to date. See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464
(1981) (statutory rape law forbidding sex with woman under 18 not violate equal protec-
tion when 17 1/2 year old male held criminally responsible for intercourse with 16 1/2 year
old female).
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world of others, those seemingly like us as well as those seemingly
different. 43 All the abstract discussions in which I've been involved
concerning racism in the execution of law couldn't add up to the sin-
gle, sad story of an attorney friend who is black. He went home for
vacation. He was driving back to his parent's house from a movie
when police pulled him and his three passengers over, ordered him
out of the car, slammed him against the hood, and spread eagled him.
I was outraged, appalled. This was my friend. He's an attorney, and a
good one. In response, he just gave me a sad smile, shrugged, and
simply said, "that's the way it is back home." Hearing this wonderful
man speak in such a sad, resigned voice transformed all my previous
ideas about the racist use of legally sanctioned force" from a concept
in my cortex to something that felt, yes felt, like a sharp kick in the
stomach. 45 So I surely believe in the whole litany of narrative re-
demption: Hearing others' stories and feeling others' worlds in the
concrete helps dissolve stereotypes, 46 leads one to respect and value
those stories and, in the process, leads to incorporating those different
stories into the development and analysis of law-a necessary step to
counter skewed laws and law giving47 which have limited the stories
43 When we read and take in a story, we honor the existence of other worlds. Some of
us have difficulty seeing any world other than our own. We act as if the only world
that deserves to be considered real is the immediate world of our own intentions and
desires, the world of our own interests. We have difficulty hearing the "voice" of the
other, embodied as it is in stories and worlds of experience and intention other than
our own.
James R. Elkins, The Stories We Tell Ourselves in Law, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 53 (1990)
(footnote omitted). See also Bell, supra note 38; Goldfarb, supra note 29, at 1632-33 ("Sto-
ries, whether real or potentially real, provide listeners with vivid historical detail necessary
for a vicarious experience that may awaken empathy."). See also Goldfarb, supra note 5,
at 79. But as Professor Grose cautions, to be effective these "outsider narratives" must be
integrated "into the common sense of insiders." Carolyn Grose, Essay-A Field Trip To
Benetton ...And Beyond: Some Thoughts on "Outsider Narrative" In A Law School
Clinic, 4 CLIN. L. REv. 109, 119-20 (1997).
44 The power of the state is the power to do violence: "The most basic of the texts of
jurisdiction are the apologies for the state itself and for its violence .. " Cover, supra note
17, at 54.
45 Narratives also carry the power of a moral yardstick against which to measure the
actual workings of our law, West, supra note 23, at 209, and can offer a guide for our own
ethical development, Goldfarb, supra note 5, at 66.
46 See Margulies, supra note 22, at 702 ("Shared narratives also counter the use of
stereotypes-stock stories, told by the oppressors without the input of the oppressed.").
47 Much has been written about the power of narrative to confront bias and unfairness
in the law, e.g.:
[F]or over a century now, feminists have claimed that distinctive aspects of women's
experiences and perspectives offer resources for constructing more representative,
more empathic, more creative, and, in general, better theories, laws, and social
practices.
Martha Minow, Feminist Reason, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 49 (1988). See also Abrams,
supra note 10, at 1034 ("Workers' narratives have been used, for example, to demonstrate
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told and heard.48
(2) Client-Centered Representation-an inevitable conclusion
Given how I feel about narrative, I naturally bought into the no-
tion of client-centered representation hook, line, and sinker. 49 It
that women's perspectives on the types of acts that constitute sexual harassment are differ-
ent from men's and to argue for a 'reasonable woman' standard in evaluating sexual har-
assment claims; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 27, at 47 (footnote omitted) (discusses how
stories of real women's work lives as pregnant women can impact current law); Delgado,
supra note 24, at 2413, 2436 ("This proliferation of counterstories is not an accident or
coincidence. Oppressed groups have known instinctually that stories are an essential tool
to their survival and liberation. Members of out-groups can use stories in two basic ways:
First, as a means of psychic self-preservation and, second, as a means of lessening their own
subordination."); Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 874 ("... the feminist goal is to redevelop
the law by infiltrating legal doctrine with alternative narratives"); Goldfarb, supra note 5,
at 65 (footnote. omitted) ("The critical bite derives from the commitment within each of
these movements [critical race theory, feminist theory, law and literature, and narrative
jurisprudence] to include the pluralist perspectives of subordinated peoples, whose stories
have been so frequently overlooked in the formulation of legal theory and of the dominant
stream of cultural understandings."); Brenda Waugh, A Theory of Employment Discrimi-
nation, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 113 (1990) (author uses poems about her experiences when
interviewing for a legal job while pregnant to provide concrete view of the reality of gender
discrimination). For a discussion, however, of how the mainstream Feminist analysis of
contracts leaves out the experiences, and therefore concerns, of Lesbian feminists, see
Testy, supra note 19, at 231-34. Similarly, Professor Chon has written extensively about
the exclusion of Asian voices in the law and, at the same time, the paradox of attempting to
speak in the "authentic" Asian (Asian-American, Chinese, Korean, Chinese-American,
etc.) voice. See Margaret (H.R.) Chon, Being Between, 3 LOYOLA ENTER. L. J. 571 (1997);
Chon on Chen on Chang, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1535 (1996); On the Need for Asian American
Narratives in Law: Ethnic Specimens, Native Informants, Storytelling and Silences, 3
U.C.L.A. ASIAN PAC. AMER. L. J. 4 (1995). At the same time she has cautioned about the
limitation of narrative as a remedial tool:
Legal storytelling is an attempt at these countercultural forms. Although the self-
conscious use of "story-telling" is an important tool in the critical race toolkit, stories
do both too much and too little. In a larger sense, stories are deployed to buttress
myriad ideological positions and intellectual arguments. In a smaller sense, stories
are not the trump card-they cannot convince those who are not inclined to listen
carefully or those who might be captured by a different ideological identification.
Margaret (H.R.) Chon, Acting Upon Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics
by Lisa Lowe, 76 OR. L. REV. 765, 772 (1997) (book review).
48 In fact, the very use of stories as a legitimate means of argumentation combats the
value-based notion that only rational, scientific argumentation is legitimate. See, e.g.,
Abrams, supra note 10, at 976; Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal
Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 681-84 (1994). For a discussion of how even rational logic is
culturally contextualized, see Jill J. Ramsfield, Is 'Logic' Culturally Based? A Contrastive,
International Approach to the U.S. Law Classroom, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 157 (1997).
49 The theory of client-centered represenation in lawyering initially evolved from the
work of therapist Carl Rogers, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling:
Reappraisal And Refinement, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 501, 538 (1990); Linda F. Smith, Interview-
ing Clients: A Linguistic Comparison of The 'Traditional' Interview And The 'Client-Cen-
tered' Interview, 1 CLIN. L. REV. 541, 552 (1994); ANDREW S. WATSON, THE LAWYER IN
Tim INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING PROCESS (1976). The current theory of client-cen-
tered representation-a theory "accepted and adopted throughout the nation's law
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couldn't be otherwise. If narrative was so central to advocacy and, at
the same time, was a primary mechanism by which law creation and
application became skewed, plainly I wanted my focus to be on get-
ting the client's authentic story.50 I confess that it wasn't always so.
My client interactions in the earlier years of my practice as a criminal
defense attorney were characterized by trying to get "relevant" infor-
mation to fit into my legal categories.5 1 The rest I edited out.52 I as-
sumed the client wanted to win in the most traditional sense. I know
that I certainly did. It was my case, and I was incensed with any cli-
ents who inserted themselves into the process in a way that could
screw up my case.53 I liked my clients, and I consistently won their
cases in my terms but in truth I saw them as the required ticket to play
the game far more than as real individuals with real lives and stories. I
schools," Smith, supra at 543-attained its present form in the works of GARY BELLOW &
BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN
ADVOCACY (1978) and DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND
COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1977). See also DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL
BERGMAN, SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS As COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH
(1991) [hereinafter, COUNSELORS]. Put succinctly: "[C]lient-centered counseling, or client
decision making, holds that lawyers should interact with clients in a way that allows clients
to make decisions themselves." Miller, supra note 9, at 503.
50 For a clear articulation of the relationship between narrative and client-centered rep-
resentation, see Cook, Supra note 5, at 41:
Many of us already know how to create a story. Theories of the case are stories, and
we can learn much about storytelling from our own examples. We are not the only
authors of tales, however. There are others, clients and would-be clients, profession-
als and para-professionals, victims and victimizers, bureaucrats and agitators, who
have stories to tell, and their stories will in all likelihood not fit within the plot and
character outlines of either our case theories or our subplotted professional life sto-
ries. An awareness of the otherness of experience is a necessary ingredient to client-
centered service and a role of enabling people to exercise their power. Again, that
otherness often finds expression within a narrative framework.
Id. at 60.
51 In some sense it would be fair to say that I could have been the poster boy for the so-
called "traditional" approach. Contrast the client-centered conception of problems with a
more traditional view:
Under the traditional conception, lawyers view client problems primarily in terms of
existing doctrinal categories such as contracts, torts, or securities. Information is im-
portant principally to the extent the data affects the doctrinal pigeonhole into which
the lawyer places the problem. Moreover, in the traditional view, lawyers primarily
seek the best "legal" solutions to problems without fully exploring how those solu-
tions meet clients' nonlegal as well as legal concerns. [footnote omitted]
BINDER ET AL., COUNSELORS, supra note 49, at 17.
52 See Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 898 ("Bent on extracting the most efficient account
of the client's story, the lawyer hurriedly moves the client along her narrative stream, stop-
ping to glean bits of information about the legal problem, casting away narrative 'static'
about aspects of the client's life the lawyer perceives as immaterial (footnote omitted)").
53 My views were apparently not unique within the profession. See BINDER & PRICE,
supra note 49, at 17 ("Clients are less well regarded in the traditional conception. Lawyers
adhering to the traditional view have often muttered, 'The practice of law would be won-
derful it if weren't for clients.' (footnote omitted)").
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can't say when that changed-when I grew up, when I fell in love,
when I began to raise children-I can't say. But at some point, I be-
gan to see my relationship with clients differently. I still wanted to
win in traditional terms, and it is in the nature of the criminal system
that so did most of my clients, but not always. I came to respect that
some wanted to plead guilty in a case I thought I could win because
they risked losing their jobs if they had to keep coming to court, or
they didn't want to involve their family in a public court proceeding,
or such.54
By the time that I became aware of the literature on client-cen-
tered representation and its progeny, I was already culling much fuller
stories from my clients and actively involving them in strategy and
decision making. This earlier literature on client-centered representa-
tion guided me to seek even fuller stories, to continue to recognize
how much many of my clients knew,55 and overall to view my clients
54 Many cases in the lower courts tend to be relatively minor, even for the defendants.
If the defendant has to keep coming into court for hearings on some cutting-edge
motion dealing with a somewhat peripheral issue in the case, the defendant... may
lose pay, or even a job. Also, being in court can be an unpleasant, pressure-filled
experience for many. Prolonging a case with legal maneuvering that is unlikely to
produce any beneficial result may therefore unnecessarily maximize the torment.
Mitchell, Sixth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1245-46. Thus, in one study, clients some-
times refused representation because having an attorney prolongs the process, costing
them wages and time. See PAUL ROBERTSHAW, RETHINKING LEGAL NEED: THE CASE OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (1991). Similarly, Malcolm Feeley reported,
Defendants whose applications for a PD have just been approved often approach a
PD asking for and expecting an instant opinion, something that the PDs are loathe to
express. Invariably the PDs firmly and politely tell them to make an appointment so
that they can review the case in detail. While most defendants accede to these sug-
gestions, many of them continue to press the PD, emphasizing that they want to get
their case "over with today," and become irritated when the PDs refuse. This results in
tension between PDs and many of their clients, a tension that contradicts popular
opinion. For it is the defendant, anxious to get his case over with, who wants the
quick advice, and it is the PD, anxious to preserve a sense of professionalism, who
wants to extend the case and review it more carefully.
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT 222 (1979) (emphasis added). Further, as a number of recent authors
have pointed out, "it can be a mistake to assume that a client is interested only in 'winning'
[in traditional terms]," Clark D. Cunningham, A Tale of Two Clients: Thinking About Law
As Language, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2459, 2492 (1989). Accord Gilkerson, supra note 24, at
916 ("'Winning' the case is not always what disempowered clients want and need-how the
client's story is told and how the client's harm is named may be more important."). See
also Alfieri, supra note 29, at 2146 ("But 'winning' may often hold a different meaning in
the poverty law context. Mere outcome may extend beyond material benefits and compen-
sation to encompass deeper ideals of political and socioeconomic progress, and affirmation
of individual and group ideals").
55 In fact, the client may be a far better legal strategist than the attorney. See White,
supra note 30, at 47. In any event, the client generally knows his or her unique goals and
values and thus "is typically in a better position than you to choose which potential solu-
tion is best." BINDER ET AL., COUNSELORS, supra note 49, at 21, 23. See also Watson,
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as real people, many deserving of great respect, some not.56
The recent literature evolving from client-centered representa-
tion theory termed critical lawyering or theoretics of practice had an
additional impact on me.57 It made me cringe when I thought about
my early years of practice, because what the authors said was so true.
By casting my clients as powerless and dependent, with my legal story
as the only one that counted, 58 I set myself above them, enjoyed my
superiority, and stole their voice-or at least made them self-edit that
voice to give me what they knew I was seeking59-and, in the process,
to an extent I hurt them. I took their dignity, if only for the brief term
of our interaction. 6°
That has changed, though undoubtedly imperfectly. I now seek,
and teach my students to seek, the full person-a unique person, in
part defined by culture, gender, race, sexual preference, and the polit-
supra note 49, at 43 (author characterizes the client in the interview process as "teaching"
the lawyer about the client, the client's world and world view, while the lawyer is "taught"
and "learns").
56 From my experience, poverty and/or minority status does not by itself insure that the
client will be wonderful, heroic, and admirable. Some are, some aren't. They're just peo-
ple. Others agree. See, e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, A Meditation on the Theoretics of Prac-
tice, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 971, 985 (1992) (author sees as unrealistic the notion that "poor
clients are seen as all-powerful individuals awaiting only their lawyers' assistance to un-
leash their potency."); Miller, supra note 9, at 525 ("Critical lawyers proffer a naive vision
of clients, all of whom are pure of heart and eager to speak. But not all client stories are
empowering, nor are all clients empowered. Like most stories in life, client stories reveal a
broad spectrum of human character ....").
57 The critical lawyers make a major contribution to the traditional understanding of
case theory by involving clients in the choice of which story to tell and thus recogniz-
ing the importance of client life experience and strategic skills in this endeavor. [foot-
note omitted].
These critical theorists posit that client voices have been muted by the narratives that
lawyers tell on their behalf, and urge lawyers to set aside their own stories in favor of
client stories.
Miller, supra note 9, at 486, 514 (footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Symposium-Theoretics
of Practice: The Integration of Progressive Thought and Action, 43 HASTING L. J. 717
(1992); Alfieri, supra note 36; Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS L.J.
991, 1013 note 64 (1992); Goldfarb, supra note 29; GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAW-
YERING: ONE CHICANO'S VIEW OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Shalleck, supra
note 29, at 1748-49. For a self-proclaimed "mild" criticism of the movement, see Diner-
stein, supra note 56.
58 This is precisely the conduct for which Professor Alfieri has properly taken attorneys
to task. See Alfieri, supra note 29, and supra note 36. In fact, many clients do not want to
tell the story that the attorney wants to tell in court. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 54,
at 2459, 2492; Cook, supra note 5, at 50-51; White, supra note 30, at 47-48.
59 See Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 905 ("Furthermore, the hierarchical relationship
between dominant lawyer and dependent client affects the telling of her story .... In re-
sponse the client, knowingly dependent on the lawyer, may conform her story to the one
the lawyer is attempting to elicit ....").
60 See Alfieri, supra note 29, and supra note 36.
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ical world, but ultimately unique.61 I do so, not just because I believe
it is the right thing to do, but because it makes me (and my students)
better lawyers. 62 I know who I'm dealing with and can work in a rela-
tionship of mutual respect. And in truly hearing the client's story, the
client and I (and/or the students) can make a range of strategic deci-
sions which otherwise would not be possible. First, it guides us in de-
ciding whether or not to even tell the story63-e.g., tell the story
because it's a winner. Tell the story even if it will lose because voicing
the story regardless of consequences is what matters to the client.64
Don't tell the story because it will lose. Or, even if it will win, don't
tell it because it's private, intimate, and none of the business of a
group of strangers and bureaucrats who would hear it. Second, it per-
mits a full collaboration in creating the richest 65 case theory we can
61 In seeking out the full person, one faces a paradox and risk, i.e., in seeking each
aspect of their existence, one may wind up with a list of where the client falls on a spectrum
of categories but, in the process lose the real person. Professor White insightfully articu-
lates the dilemma in Lucie E. White, "Seeking... 'The Faces of Otherness. ... A Response
to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn," 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1499 (1992):
But there is also a deeper problem with the two conditions for empathy that Profes-
sor Cahn's essay identifies. This deeper problem is that these two paths toward em-
pathy are also practices of domination. The advice that we must find out the "facts"
of the other to feel empathy toward her counsels us to objectify that person, to con-
fine her subjectivity in categories that we construct. And the idea that to feel empa-
thy with the other person we must identify with her, along such dimensions as race,
parental status, and class, dashes all hope of empathy in many settings. In those few
circumstances where empathy remains possible, this view condones practices of per-
ception and definition that "essentialize" the other, naming her as more "like" us
than she may wish to be. These practices of collecting facts about the other or cata-
loguing similarities with her may indeed enable us to feel closer to the other person.
At the same time, however, such practices effect interpersonal domination. Perhaps
we must take such steps, if we seek to understand the other. But we must also re-
nounce these practices, or at least our confidence that they can work, if we are to
recognize the other as a fellow-unique-human being.
Id. at 1508.
62 Professor Goldfarb gave vivid expression to this belief:
In other words, when student and client develop a contextualized presentation of the
client's participation in events, rather than an oversimplified version that avoids the
complexity and nuance of real life, they enable clients to retain and convey their
personhood, and therefore their dignity, before lawyer, judge, and all others involved
in the legal process. And when judges and other decisionmakers appreciate the per-
sonhood of those on whom they pass judgment, they reach better decisions, for they
can locate these persons in their authentic situations, rather than see them as decon-
textualized cartoons.
Goldfarb, supra. note 29, at 1685 (footnote omitted).
63 As Professor Miller points out, clients will have their own reasons for presenting or
not presenting a particular theory, will possess a good sense of whether certain types of
theories (e.g., race) will persuade a jury, and be in the best position to decide what possible
objectives are most desirable. See Miller, supra note 9, at 564, 569.
64 See Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 916.
65 For a discussion of the notion of "rich" narratives, see Mitchell, Sixth Amendment,
supra note 27, at 1307-10.
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put forth.66 Third, it provides the capacity to assess whether to take
the story as a wedge to move the constructed boundary between the
legal and non-legal in an attempt to expand or redirect the particular
area of law involved towards a new (and presumably better)
understanding.67
In telling that story, whether viewed as collaborator 68 or transla-
tor,69 I want it to be their story, their "voice."'70 I want to tell it as
authentically as another person can, given that everything told me is
filtered through my own interpretive screens.71 I am sincere in this
effort, committed to the endeavor. And all that I am doing is
grounded in theory-narrative and client-centered representation the-
ories interwoven, congruent, in harmonious reinforcement of each
other.
66 Interestingly, Professor Miller, while sympathetic to the critical lawyering agenda,
posits that the proponents of critical lawyering theory have swung the pendulum too far
back from lawyer to client-control of the story. In exalting the client's voice, and viewing
the lawyer-client interaction as a take no prisoners encounter between the client's and the
lawyer's narratives, some critical lawyers seem to be opting for all but abandoning their
skill and knowledge as lawyers to the client's detriment. Instead, Professor Miller suggests
a client-attorney collaboration in the selection and development of case theory. Miller,
supra note 9, at 503-504, 524-29, 564-66, 576. I agree.
67 It has been said that "the line between legal and non-legal worlds in the lives of
indigent clients" is a false construct. See Shalleck, supra note 29, at 1749-51. That I believe
is true. But the falsity of this dichotomy between legal and non-legal goes beyond the
world of the indigent. The dichotomy is an illusion which denies the mechanism by which
law changes, i.e., when the formally non-legal becomes "relevant" to legal outcomes. See,
e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1990):
The expansion of existing boundaries of relevance based upon changed perceptions
of the world is familiar to the process of legal reform. The shift from Plessy v. Fergu-
son to Brown v. Board of Education, for example, rested upon the expansion of the
"legally relevant" in race discrimination cases to include the actual experiences of
black Americans and the inferiority implicit in segregation. Much of the judicial
reform that has been beneficial to women, as well, has come about through ex-
panding the lens of legal relevance to encompass the missing perspectives of women
and to accommodate perceptions about the nature and role of women. Feminist
practical reasoning compels continued expansion of such perceptions.
Id. at 863. For a discussion of how "outsider narratives" helped alter the law of sexual
harassment through making the previously non-legal (i.e., the emotional reactions of
women to workplace harassment) relevant to the legal see Grose, supra note 43, at 120-21
(footnote omitted).
68 For discussions of the nature of the attorney client interaction when the attorney is
engaged with the client in collaborative storytelling, see Alfieri, supra note 29, at 2140-41;
Miller, supra note 9, at 564-66, 576; Shalleck, supra note 29, at 1749.
69 For detailed analysis of the attorney as "translator," see Cunningham, supra note 54,
at 2482-93; Gilkerson, supra note 24, at 914-20.
70 In referring to client "voice," of course it is important to recognize that we all have
multiple voices. I am a husband, father, law professor, man, goof-ball, Jewish, etc., and at
different times I speak with each of these voices. See, e.g., Chon, supra note 47.
71 See, e.g., Shalleck, supra note 29, at 1749 ("[Wlhile recognizing the importance of
seeking out and describing the details of clients' lives, this work [critical lawyering theory]
explicitly acknowledges the partiality and uncertainty of all clients and their world.").
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And then I go into court on some run of the mill criminal cases,
and it all falls apart. The harmony between narrative and client-cen-
tered representation breaks down. And there is nothing special about
these cases. They simply are criminal cases which include what I will
term "troublesome" client stories. By that, I mean narratives in which
the client wants to tell the story, can fully express his/her voice to the
jury, can provide the jury with the concrete details of his/her world
that provide the necessary context for evaluating that story, and the
story is arguably true, but the fact finder will nevertheless automati-
cally discount the story because the story is not plausible within the
narrative structures available to the fact finder.72
I recognize that Client-centered Representation does not simplis-
tically reduce to a single admonition: Tell the client's story. The con-
cept is far more nuanced than that. It incorporates a constellation of
ideas. Listen to the client's story. Hear what they want. Try to be
creative about ways to tell the story. Look for opportunities to bring
their story into the legal process. At the same time, join together to
discuss any risks and problems which may result from various strategic
choices, including the risks in even telling the story and whether those
risks are worth it to the client. But, when all the dust settles, as a
general proposition the theory of Client-centered Representation
guides us towards telling the client's story, opening the jury to the
client's true voice. Narrative theory, however, teaches us that all sto-
ries are socially constructed, and that the stories we hear will be evalu-
72 This seems to me to be of a different nature than the one faced by Professor Diner-
stein when he had a client who wanted to tell her story, wanted to win the case, but, as a
matter of law, her story was a loser. Dinerstein, supra note 49, at 972-73. Rather it is akin
to the phenomenon Professor Grose describes when factfinders listen to "outsider" stories:
Another term for pre-understanding is the one I used in the beginning of this essay:
"common sense." Judges almost always admonish juries "not to leave your common
sense outside the jury room." Indeed, common sense is much of the reason behind
our jury system-if we didn't want the common understanding of the community to
influence the outcomes of cases, we would let the judge decide the case. So when a
fact-finder's common sense tells him or her that people don't act the way the plantiffs
or defendants in this case acted, he or she is likely to reject that plaintiff's or defen-
dant's story. The fact-finder cannot integrate these stories into his or her under-
standing of the world.
Grose, supra note 43, at 119. In fact, Professor Grose sees this same pre-understanding as
an impediment to accurate evaluation of the client's story even in her clinic students:
Indeed, unless the pre-understanding of the attorney-and, by definition, the law
student-is challenged early on, certain clients' cases won't ever get to a judge or a
jury. Their stories will be rejected as untrue or unworthy. As we saw, Marci's story
was doomed before she had even begun to tell it to the Legal Services student. This
was so not because the student interviewing her had no interest in representing her,
or meant not to believe her, but because her story did not comport with his common
sense about how the world worked.
Id. at 122.
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ated against our own self-constructed narrative worlds. So you can
offer the client's voice all you want to fulfill Client-centered Repre-
sentation, but Narrative theory will guide the factfinders to discount
that voice because it clashes with the world that is contained in their
own stories. Therein is the collision between client "voice" and narra-
tive theory.
In what follows, I present two criminal cases with "troubling" sto-
ries in which students in our clinic represented the defendant. I then
discuss my own model of narrative theory that I use in preparing stu-
dents to do criminal defense advocacy, and apply that model to the
two cases. Next, I analyze the sources of conflict between narrative
and client-centered representation in the two cases, specifically con-
sidering schema theory, social construction of personal reality, and the
"story theory" of juror decision making. Lastly, I discuss the tack we
took in the two cases to deal with this conflict-the use of experts-
and then trace the journey that choice took us on.73
I. Two RUN OF THE MILL CRIMINAL CASES
While every case is unique, and hence calling them run of the mill
may be seen as misleading as well as understating their significance to
the individual defendants, it is important to recognize that the two
cases I am about to describe are not aberrational. They are much like
the array of cases which year after year regularly come into the
clinic.74 These two cases are basically one-witness misdemeanor cases,
with a police officer and a peripheral witness or two thrown in for a
few details. One is a charge of attempted sexual assault, the other
illegal possession of a concealed weapon (handgun). Our client in the
sexual assault case is a man in his mid-thirties from an Asian country,
which, for a variety of reasons, I will not identify. He has consistently
had strong family and community support, particularly from his
church, and a number of his supporters came with him on the day of
trial. He immigrated to America five years ago and has since lived in
an enclave of his fellow countrymen and countrywomen. He speaks
very little English and thus requires an interpreter. On the date of the
incident for which he stands trial, he was working as a piano player in
a department store. At some point, he took a break and went to the
73 For a powerful (wonderfully footnoteless) essay on, among other things, the impor-
tance of turning our narrative theories and storytelling into the actual practice and service
of others, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., Vampires Anonymous And Critical Race Theory, 95
MicH. L. REv. 741 (1997).
74 I have taken the liberty of altering the details of these two cases (embellishing and
adding elements from other cases) to the extent I felt required to protect our clients' pri-
vacy, to respect our confidential relationship with them, and to more clearly illustrate the
issues raised in this essay.
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nearby washroom. The alleged victim, a customer shopping with his
family, claims that the defendant went to the urinal next to him and
suddenly tried to grab the man's penis. As the man hurried out of the
washroom, he claims the defendant also kept saying, "Hey man, you
come back here . . ." Defendant has always denied ever trying to
touch the man's penis or assault him in any other way.
The client in the handgun case is an eighteen-year-old black man,
who is a senior at a local high school. He came to trial by himself, as
has been the case with every appointment and court appearance we've
had. He's a nice, articulate young man who a year ago was in a gang.
He left the gang after some of its members were involved in a drive-by
shooting and at the time of trial was in the process of deciding
whether he wanted to attend college or vocational school after high
school graduation. In his case, a witness had called the police saying
he saw a young black man get out of the passenger seat of a car with a
gun in his hand, look around, and get back in the car, at which point
the car drove away. The car was driven by a second young black man,
with a third in the backseat. The witness provided police with a very
general description both of the man with the gun and the car. Ten
minutes later, the same witness called the police again. The car and
the suspect were now at a local 7-Eleven; the witness would wait for
the police. When the police arrived, the witness pointed out three
young black men getting into a white VW bug, and pointed out the
man getting in the front seat passenger door as the man who had the
gun. That man was our client. Police approached the driver and owner
of the vehicle and obtained his consent to search. In the glove com-
partment, they found a handgun. Defendant was arrested and the gun
taken into evidence. Our client denied that either he or anyone else in
the car ever touched the gun and maintained that they had the wrong
man.
II. USING A NARRATIVE THEORY MODEL AS AN ADVOCACY
GUIDE IN OUR Two CASES
A. The Narrative Model
The model I employ for my clinical supervision in criminal advo-
cacy rests on narrative theories, and can best be defined as one con-
stantly directing and sensitizing the students towards competing
narratives.75 The model begins with the case theory. Case theory, an
75 Interestingly, much of constitutional criminal procedure facilitates use of information
in storytelling at trial. Rules regarding the jury venire make it more likely that the defen-
dant will have a least some jurors whose culture and experiences will permit similar narra-
tive interpretation of information to that of the defendant. Thus, the defendant has a right
to have the jury panel selected from a "fair cross-section of the community," Taylor v.
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overall strategic guide melding a legal framework and a factual
story,76 is the broadest narrative of many increasingly specific and
complex ones with which the students will deal.77 Sometimes the
"story" will be rooted in that of the client, but not always. Again, a
criminal defendant can put on no evidence and raise a purely reason-
able doubt defense, attacking the prosecution's case as one whose nar-
rative "does not make sense" or "cannot be trusted" or "raises
suspicion, but nothing more." In this defense, if anyone's story is told,
it will be one the defense tells of the prosecution's witnesses and their
motivations, fear and confusion at the moment of their perceptions,
etc. Even if based on the client's story, the client will not necessarily
testify. The essence of the story may come out in the prosecution's
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), and to have race excluded as a factor in selection of the
jury panel, Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970), and even individual jurors, Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Neither can gender lie at the basis of an individual jury
strike. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, (1993). Further, narratives must be based on trial
information, not information in the form of prejudicial pretrial publicity. Irwin v. Dowd,
366 U.S. 717 (1961). And, of course, defense counsel has the right to give a closing argu-
ment, telling the client's story. See generally, Crane v. Kentucky, 476, U.S. 683 (1986)
(fundamental principle of due process that defendant permitted to argue that the state has
not proved all elements beyond a reasonable doubt). Likewise, it is access to and the use
of "information" which is at stake when the Court speaks to potential withholding of excul-
patory or so-called Brady material, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), when it finds due process violated by the govern-
ment's deliberate presentation of false information, Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959),
when it addresses destruction of information by the government, Arizona v. Youngblood,
488 U.S. 51 (1988), when it finds that due process demands that a state-created evidence
rule must give way to a defendant's right to present evidence of his innocence, Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), when it defines the scope of confrontation to include
eliciting information about a witness's probation status, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974), or address, Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968), Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687 (1931). But see McGrath v. Vinzant, 528 F.2d 681, 684 (1st Cir., 1976) (in context of
case, constitutionally permissible for prosecution to refuse to divulge address of alleged
rape victim), and when it establishes the showing a defendant must make in discovery to
overcome a claim of state-created privilege, Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
76 For an extensive discussion of the process of developing case theories and represen-
tational strategies (the overall strategy for achieving a client's objectives), see MARILYN
BERGER, ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY 17-35
(1988) (hereinafter BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY); MARILYN BERGER, ET AL.,
TRIAL ADVOCACY TRAINING: PLANNING, ANALYSIS, AND STRATEGY, 17-33 (1989) (here-
inafter BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY); see also Miller, supra note 9; Richard K. Neu-
mann Jr., On Strategy, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 299 (1990) (exploring the process of creating
strategy, the effect of temperament on strategy, and the ways in which strategy is learned
and most effectively taught).
77 While I focus on the case theory narrative, I also try to make the students appreciate
that, for a jury, an actual trial is a set of stories within stories (such as the stories of, e.g.,
how the defendant or victim reacted on the stand, the interaction between the judge and
one or more counsel, the actions of each attorney, the interactions between the attorneys,
and so on). All these sundry "stories" will influence the ultimate narrative the jurors will
accept, and thus their decision.
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case from statements the defendant allegedly made, or from the direct
and cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, or from defense
witnesses.
Case theory, however, has its limitations. While it provides an
overarching strategic structure, it is analogous to the outside steel
frame of a skyscraper. More pliable material than legal theories and
overarching stories, and thus a far more nuanced guide than case the-
ory can offer is needed to fill in the details of the ultimate structure
comprising an effective trial strategy. That more pliable raw material
is "information," 78 and with information as building material, the
more nuanced guide for construction takes the form of a maxim: All
that exists in a courtroom is information, lack of information, and the
inferences 79 from that information and its lack; these inferences in
turn create the narratives and subnarratives which eventually com-
pose the case theory. Additionally, these inferences must make sense
to the factfinder in terms of their notion of logic, personal experience,
and cultural education/bias. It is here, in the assessment of what infer-
ences may be drawn as well as the interrelated question of whether
those inferences make sense, that the notion of diversity plays out.80
The key is to understand the "significance" of all the information in
the case (i.e., the credible inferences and narratives). 81 This ultimately
78 See Marilyn Berger & John Mitchell, Rethinking Advocacy Training, 16 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 821, 831-32 (1993); BERGER ET AL., PRETRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 76, at 11-
12; BERGER ET AL., TRIAL ADVOCACY, supra note 76, at 11-12.
79 Id. For an excellent exposition of the role of inferences, see ALBERT J. MOORE,
PAUL BERGMAN & DAVID A. BINDER, TRIAL ADVOCACY: INFERENCES, ARGUMENTS AND
TECHNIQUES (1996); Albert J. Moore, Inferential Streams: The Articulation and Illustration
of the Trial Advocate's Evidentiary Intuitions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 611 (1987).
80 See Mitchell, Sixth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1311-14.
81 The analysis becomes more complex as one focuses upon the relationship between
the information and the chain of inferences. Generally, some inferences in the chain
formed between information and the ultimate statement in a narrative will be supported by
assumptions, some of which require further information and some which do not. Imagine a
case where one piece of information is that a particular organization has no record that one
of the parties made a complaint. The other party wants to draw the following from this
information: If a complaint had been made, the organization would have a record; since
they have no record, there was no complaint; this is just the type of incident one would
complain about; since we can infer that the party did not complain, we can infer that the
underlying incident never happened. Now, this chain of inferences contains a number of
assumptions.... For example, someone would complain about this type of incident. But
would they? Whether or not you will need more information or can rely upon a rhetorical
claim to some accepted cultural belief about behavior in our society will depend on the
nature and circumstances of the incident. Even if you can rely on such a rhetorical claim,
you still have to be careful. The party may be able to raise circumstances which would
fulfill a culturally accepted exception to this otherwise general expectation (e.g., he had
amnesia). Also assumed in the above chain is that the organization has a procedure for
complaints; that the system is accurate; and that the information in the system is being
accurately interpreted. All this will likely require presentation of further specific informa-
tion to the factfinder. The further assumptions that the party would have known about the
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leads to being attuned to competing narratives, including those from
the same piece or pieces of information. 82 Accordingly, you must al-
ways be wary of the adversary turning your own case on you.
B. Techniques for Applying the Model
A "model" such as the one I have described, however, is likely to
be of little interest unless it can be applied to developing effective case
narratives in the context of an actual trial. A concrete understanding
of the application of the model, in turn, is best achieved within con-
crete cases. I will therefore explore how the model guided the defense
in our two cases. But first, a caveat. In actual practice, the creation of
a case theory and supporting narratives involves, and even necessi-
tates, more fragmented perceptions, sudden insights, intuition, luck,
and cycling back and forth between narrative and information than
any "model" can reflect. Nor can a model precisely guide the levels of
nuanced rhetoric needed to tie it all together. Yet as a general descrip-
tion of how I apply the model when I work with students (and, for that
matter, when I have tried cases myself or have acted as a consultant to
experienced attorneys), the following captures the basic approach.
As an overview, the translation of the model to practice consists
of two steps: (1) arrive at the basic assertions from which the narrative
will be constructed; (2) determine the precise information and/or lack
of information which provides the inferences which support the asser-
tions. Fine. But how do you arrive at these assertions? That, after all,
seems to be the big trick. Good question. In essence, I am asking stu-
dents, "What is your story and what information do you have to sup-
port it; what is the adversary's story and what information do you
have to attack it?" And there will be sessions during our time working
together that this is the form my discussion with the students will take.
Other times, I will concentrate upon problematic information in their
case and/or strong aspects of the prosecution's case and explore how
to deal with this information (e.g., evidentiary or constitutional crimi-
nal procedure motions to exclude it, rhetorical strategies to turn the
inferences in our favor or at least to neutralize the inferences, and as a
last resort, voir dire strategies to desensitize the factfinder to the in-
formation: "You will see gory photographs. How will that affect
particular system of recording complaints, would have felt free to use it, and would not
have chosen an alternative avenue for redress, may or may not require further information
for support. Again this will depend on whether these assumptions along the chain of infer-
ences are supported by general cultural beliefs.
82 Two by-products of this focus on information are that students become more attuned
to the range and nuance of available information in discovery and investigation, and that
they come to see evidence as concerned with controlling information (get yours in; keep
theirs out) and, thus, ultimately as controlling the available narratives which may be told.
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you? ... Some people would look at those photos of that poor, dead
woman and say that someone's going to pay and it won't take too
much evidence for them to convict whoever they think did that. How
do you feel about that? Etc.") At still other times, we will carefully
work with the chain of inferences from a single piece of somewhat
ambiguous information.
At some stages of our work together (and this intuitive judgment
varies with each student team) more focused techniques are needed to
guide the students in translating my model of competing narratives
into the form which is usable for trial, i.e., assertions and information.
In the criminal defense arena where I supervise, I use two basic tech-
niques to derive these assertions, each of which is grounded in narra-
tive and its role in juror decision-making and helps put the following
concepts into practice:
1. The prosecution story must "make sense" (as must the defense
story if the defense is putting on more than a reasonable doubt
defense); and
2. The narratives will be evaluated against the juror's own stock
stories, scripts, schemata, etc.
In the first technique, I translate the notion that a narrative must
"make sense" into a form which will yield useful assertions by asking
the students: "Assuming your client did it as the prosecution wit-
ness(es) claim, what is there about the defendant's and/or prosecution
witness(es)' behavior which does not make sense, is surprising, seems
unlikely, is unexpected, would be extremely stupid?" Now all of us
who have done trials know that truth is stranger than fiction, clients
do incredibly unlikely and even extremely stupid things, and all these
narrative elements which do not make sense are nevertheless possible.
But that's all right. This is a criminal case. We are dealing in a regime
in which the prosecution has the burden, and it is an extreme one.
Possibilities do not help our adversary, particularly when they are un-
likely possibilities. The prosecution must present the most likely possi-
bility, beyond a reasonable doubt. Unlikely possibilities, on the other
hand, become reasonable doubts when framed in the rhetoric of a
criminal defense advocate. Similarly, asking the students at some
point to assume the client is totally innocent, and then to determine
what in the defendant's and/or the prosecution witness(es)' actions
does not make sense, will yield problematic gaps in the defense narra-
tive which must be addressed (through evidence, argument, voir dire,
etc.). One must likewise account for such gaps if the defendant and/or
defense witnesses actively take the stand and present a story.
The second technique I use is based upon the perception that in
assessing information presented at trial, jurors evaluate the informa-
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tion by using their own narratives that are triggered by the informa-
tion. A vast array exists of such private stories that will be triggered by
a trial, some of which are so idiosyncratic that you could never imag-
ine them. As a technique I use three stock narratives to help create
the story supporting our case theory: (1) the story of perfect guilt;
(2) the story of complete innocence; and (3) the story of the total liar.
In using the "story of perfect guilt," I first ask the students to
imagine the strongest prosecution case they can which parallels their
facts, a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt ten times over.
Drawing upon their own experience and their understanding of the
culture of the factfinder, they begin to fill in the story. From my expe-
rience, students come up with very similar renditions of this story re-
gardless of their background. Once they have a full, rich story of guilt,
I ask them to compare this story to their client's case and see what's
"missing." With this analysis, they can derive information from which
they can present a picture to the jury which is (perhaps significantly)
removed from the story of perfect guilt, and in that contrast between
the narratives perhaps raise a reasonable doubt.
Likewise, the "story of complete innocence" seeks a stereotypical
image of innocence and then compares that to the client's behavior.
To the extent the client's behavior corresponds with this story, it raises
questions about his guilt. Behavior which conflicts with this story, on
the other hand, is problematic and must be explained. This is a strange
path upon which the students and I must journey because in some
sense it is more myth-based than scientific or reality-based. How does
an innocent person act when confronted by the police? They cooper-
ate, says a middle-class jury reared in the '50s. That, however, is un-
likely to be the view of everyone in the culture. What, after all, does
cooperation have to do with innocence (unless perhaps the charge in-
volves intoxication and police claim that the defendant was belliger-
ent)? A guilty person may cooperate in hopes of conning the police.
An innocent person may be uncooperative because of fear, past bad
experiences with police, anger at being wrongly detained, or because
of the behavior of the particular police. Nonetheless, the story of com-
plete innocence is a good and necessary starting point from which stu-
dents can then make the complex judgments about factfinder beliefs
and unique client experience which a particular case may require.
The "story of the total liar" is a parody of a factfinder's image of
the ultimately dishonest witness. As such, it incorporates the range of
stock impeachment techniques (motive, convictions, inconsistent
statements, perceptual problems) and applies them to the prosecu-
tion's witness(es). From the perspective of defense witnesses, on the
other hand, to the extent they do not share these attributes of the
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"total liar," they distance themselves from this negative story
C. Applying the Model to Our Two Cases
Based on an analysis derived from the approach I've just de-
scribed, the students and I concluded that there are two alternative
narratives available in the sexual assault case, one if the client testifies,
one if he does not. If the client does not testify, the students will pres-
ent a reasonable doubt case along the lines that something probably
happened in the bathroom, but, because the prosecution's story does
not make sense, there is at least a reasonable doubt that it was not
what the alleged victim claims. The first-level and initial problem with
our attack on the government's narrative reflects a common and re-
current pattern in our criminal cases: Why would the victim lie about
this event between himself and a total stranger; alternatively, how
could he be mistaken? From the information the students intend to
bring out at trial (based on the victim's signed statement to police,
tape recorded interviews with neutral witnesses, and the police re-
port), they anticipate reinforcing their "not make sense" approach by
providing two stories in response to the question of how the victim
could be lying or mistaken: A reasonable doubt exists because the al-
leged victim was an opportunist who saw the chance to accuse a man
who could not even speak English in his defense, and then sue the
store-employer for negligently hiring him. Alternatively, all the vic-
tim's perceptions were skewed by homophobia. The specific "informa-
tion" and inferences from which these defense narratives were to be
created was anticipated to come out in testimony as follows:
INFORMATION
" the defendant was working in the store as a
piano player at the time
" he was Asian
" he was wearing a tuxedo
" the bathroom was a few hundred feet from
where he had taken a break from playing
the piano
" the victim had never seen the defendant
before
" the victim was relatively large, physically fit,
and worked as a treetopper
" the defendant was small, slight
" the victim never pushed or struck at the
defendant when he allegedly grabbed for
him
" victim never yelled at defendant
" victim did not jump back, merely stepped
INFERENCES
Not make sense that defendant would do,
one hundred percent chance would be
caught, lose job, be arrested, etc.
Not make sense defendant would do
Defendant wouldn't do; would likely get
beaten up.
Victim would likely have beaten up
Victim's behavior not consistent with what
would expect if this really happened 8
3
83 As discussed, the prosecutor will respond with a competing narrative: The victim was
so taken by surprise and shocked by what happened that he couldn't respond. In fact, his
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back and zipped up
" victim didn't urinate on self
" victim told first store employee to whom
spoke that man in bathroom acting "weird,"
never mentioned assault
" not want to report to security
" victim had several priors, including giving
false information to a police officer
" Victim could tell that defendant barely
spoke English
" Victim has retained an attorney to sue the
store
" Victim claims incident destroyed marriage;
led to arguments as wife wondered if he had
encouraged the defendant by showing sexual
interest in a man
" always uncomfortable anyway urinating next
to another man
" victim claims defendant reached around a
divider to touch him
" photograph showing what washroom looked
like at time of incident shows no divider
between urinals
not make sense, if happened, victim would
know defendant a danger to others
84
Draws victim's credibility in question;
changes fact-finder's image of this "good
citizen"
Alleged victim an opportunist; has a motive
to make money from this and thus distort
the event
Hard to imagine this incident could have
such a drastic effect, and thus victim's real
motive and credibility in question
Can also infer homophobia and thus
possibility the alleged victim misperceived,
reconceptualized, etc. whatever happened in
washroom
Victim lying to embellish, or at least
misperceiving
If the defendant testifies, his story will be that he had walked up
to the urinal while the alleged victim was at the adjacent urinal. Be-
cause he thought he knew the man, our client said something in greet-
ing, and went to shake his hand. The man backed away and left. Based
on our client's story, the victim is misperceiving far more than lying,
and merely attributing the wrong intent to our client. Most of the in-
formation supporting the "not make sense" defense would still be ap-
plicable. Once again it will be used to question whether defendant
would have done such a thing under the circumstances, and to infer
that, on some level, the victim must have perceived that the client's
hand movements were not towards his penis. The lack of a divider and
existence of a lawsuit along with the claim of a ruined marriage would
reinforce that the victim misperceived, had a motive encouraging mis-
perception, and a phobia underlying it all. The underlying problem
with the client's narrative, and the problem which makes the story
"troublesome" is, unlike the first-level problem of lying or being mis-
lack of any response is itself proof of the nature of defendant's actions. Defendant will
respond that while this is a plausible construction of events, the burden is solely on the
prosecution and therefore the prosecutor's alternative construction of the information does
not make the reasonable doubts raised by the inferences drawn by the defense disappear.
84 Again, the prosecution will have a counternarrative: This was upsetting and
embarrassing, and the victim just wanted to get out of the store; he was also not going to be
explicit with his family there.
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taken, unique to the narrative or story of this case. Put simply: Why
would anyone do what our client claims he did (i.e., no one I know
would go to shake someone's hand while pissing in the urinal)?
In the gun case, the story is the same whether or not the defen-
dant testifies. Again, the first-level problem reflects a common, recur-
rent pattern: Why is the victim identifying the client if he's the wrong
person? The answer is also a common pattern. There is a reasonable
doubt based on misidentification, a reasonable doubt because defen-
dant was not the person the eyewitness saw walking out of a car with a
gun. The specific anticipated information (based on the police report
and the witness's written statement) and accompanying inferences
upon which the defense will rest is:
INFORMATION
" the witness told police that the suspect was
black, 6', early 20s, wearing a blue jacket
[our client is 18, 5'11'h", 165 lbs.]
" the witness gave no description of the
suspect's face
" the witness gave no description of the
suspect's hair
" the witness did not give police the suspect's
weight
" the witness merely described the vehicle to
police as a "small white car"
" the witness did not give the model of the
car; never said it was a VW "Bug"
" the witness did not give the make of the car
" the witness did not give the year of the car
" the witness did not describe any special
tires, detailing, etc.
" the witness did not provide any license or
partial license number
" witness was scared
" not want to draw attention to self
" the witness described the suspect as wearing
a blue jacket
" when arrested, the defendant was wearing a
blue jacket with yellow collar and trim
" the witness and defendant went to school
together
" the witness never told police that the
suspect was someone from his school
" police never saw the defendant touch the
gun
" police never saw defendant touch the glove
compartment
" police are not aware of his fingerprints
being on the gun or glove compartment
" defendant did not have any shells on his
person
" defendant did not have a holster
" the gun was not registered to defendant
" the car was not registered to defendant
INFERENCES
Witness poor perceiver; not get a good look;
not same car-everyone knows a VW "Bug"
and if witness had seen one, would have
told police
poor conditions for perceiving
circumstantial evidence that defendant the
wrong person; yellow would stick out in
mind of perceiver if had been defendant
witness would have told police when initially
called
Alternatively, explains why identified
defendant; recognized defendant from
school, not incident
Except for the eyewitness, nothing ties
defendant to the gun [except his proximity
as passenger which, by itself, is not sufficient
to even get to a jury]
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" the driver was the owner of the car
" defendant was a passenger
" defendant did not have keys to the car
" defendant did not have keys to the glove
box
The underlying problem with the narrative which makes it
"troublesome" is equally clear: what a coincidence; there just happens
to be a gun in the glovebox right in front of the very man the witness
says was holding a gun!
III. "TROUBLESOME" STORIES AND THE SOURCE OF
COLLIDING THEORIES
In one of the most extensive studies of jury decision-making in a
criminal case, sociologists Lance Bennett and Martha Feldman found
that narrative provided the key to understanding juror behavior in
two fundamental respects.85 First, narrative allowed jurors to make
sense of the trial. Opening statements aside, trials are often frag-
mented affairs in which evidence comes in a piece at a time, often
without any deference to logical order, and at times consisting of ex-
tensive evidentiary foundations which are unrelated to the substance
of the case. Jurors make sense of this by constantly trying to fit the
information they are hearing into a story. Narrative also guided the
jurors to their ultimate decision, as they looked at the stories being
presented and assessed whether they "made sense" in terms of logic,
common sense, their own experiences, their cultural. biases and be-
liefs, and their own stories about how people do or do not behave in
the situations raised in the trial. The recent study by Penning and
Hastie confirms the Bennett and Feldman thesis.86 Jurors do not
make their decisions using mathematical models, Bayesian or other-
wise.87 They decide by what Penning and Hastie call the "story
model." Like Bennett and Feldman, these researchers conclude that
jurors order the information at trial into story representations and
then compare their own stories to those offered by the parties in de-
ciding the case outcome.8 8 Their central finding was that "the story
[which the individual juror constructs] will determine the decision that
a particular juror reaches. ' 89 And again, these stories will be con-
structed from case specific information mixed in with the juror's
85 See LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981).
86 Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 520 (1991).
87 Id. at 519-20.
88 Id. at 521.
89 Id. at 521. See also id. at 525
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unique knowledge and beliefs about the world and those in it. In
other words, the juror's socially constructed reality.90 Here story
model and schema theory intersect. This is hardly surprising since the
schemas we use to describe daily life take the form of narratives. 91
Again, stories are how we discuss and describe human actions.
Recent cognitive psychologists who write on schema theory dove-
tail with Bennett and Feldman, and with Penning and Hastie. For
these psychologists, understanding is not a mere matter of stimulus (a
chair is in front of me) and response (I see a chair). Understanding is
both active and imaginative. Exposed to pieces of data, we try to
make sense of what we are perceiving by connecting the data to ex-
isting cognitive structures, which psychologists have labeled schema or
schemata. In other words, we have a schema for a "chair." When we
see a few legs, a seat, and a back, we search back and forth between
the data and our array of schemata, settle on the schema for "chair,"
and then fill in the rest from our cognitive model.92 At this point we
90 "Because all jurors hear the same evidence and have the same general knowledge
about expected structures of stories, differences in story construction must arise from differ-
ences in world knowledge; that is, differences in experiences and beliefs about the social
world." Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
91 See, e.g., Professor Moore's description of these "Social Schemas" (i.e., schema for
people, roles, and events) in Moore, supra note 3, at 281. Cf. also note 1 supra.
92 All of us carry socially-constructed conceptions of the world composed of an array of
cognitive structures that guide the constant process of interpretation that we call
giving meaning to our experience. The influences that create these structures are
both a function of our concrete experiences and our cultural knowledge base. Both
of those components of course will likely differ with class, ethnicity, gender, and
sexual orientation.
Mitchell, Sixth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1310-11 (footnotes omitted). Further elabo-
ration of the basic cognitive processes of making meaning through interpretive
frameworks, generally referred to as "schema theory," can be found in Richard C. Ander-
son, The Notion of Schemata and the Educational Enterprise: General Discussion of the
Conference, in SCHOOLING AND THE AcoUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE, 415, 419 (Richard C.
Anderson et al. eds., 1977); Robert Glaser, Education and Thinking: the Role of Knowl-
edge, 39 AM. PSYCHLOL. 93 (1984); John B. Mitchell, Current Theories on Expert and Novice
Thinking: A Full Faculty Considers the Implications for Legal Education, 39 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 275, 277-83 (1989); David E. Rumelhart, Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cogni-
tion, in THEORETICAL ISSUES IN READInG COMPREHENSION, 33 (Rand J. Spiro et al. eds.,
1980); see also Jean Piaget, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (1932) (Piaget
presents cognitive, as opposed to behavioral, theory regarding child development). This
concept of schema theory has begun to appear in the legal literature in discussions ranging
from juror decision making processes to the role of metaphor in legal reasoning. See
Moore, supra note 3; Richard K. Sherwin, Lawyering Theory: An Overview, What We Talk
About When We Talk About Law, 37 N.Y.L. ScH. L. Rev. 9, 38 (1992); Richard K. Sher-
win, Preface to Lawyering Theory Symposium: Thinking Through the Legal Culture, 37
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 1 (1992); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric
Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989); Steven L.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative Mean-
ing, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2225, 2234-44 (1989). Cf. also Scheppele, supra note 16, at 2082.
For an elaborate discussion of schema and legal expertise, see Gary L. Blasi, What Lawyers
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see a chair, although we could be fooled by, e.g., a two-dimensional
construction which gives the optical illusion of depth. In a jury trial,
jurors evaluate the information they hear in terms of their personal
schema which the particular data triggers. Like the example of the
chair, they too can be fooled when information triggers an incorrect or
idiosyncratic schema. Any particular set of information could trigger
a number of different story constructions or schemata.93 What is cho-
sen will be a function not only of the perceived relevance, but also of
the intensity of the particular schema to the individual such that it can
quickly be retrieved and brought to mind.94 Once a schema is chosen,
moreover, it biases perception. In a trial context, this means that once
jurors construct their story, they will tend to focus on information in
the case supporting their particular story, ignoring much other (per-
haps highly relevant) information. 95 Thus the "stories" of the parties
which they compare to their own may not at all be the story the par-
ties are putting forth, but rather a limited tale responding only to the
scope of the juror's idiosyncratic narrative.
Think what all of this means to our cases. Our two clients come
from worlds diverse from those of the factfinders. One is a young
black living in a very particular neighborhood/community. The other
is an Asian immigrant living in an enclave of his native land located
smack in the middle of an otherwise All-American town and neigh-
borhood. The jurors, however, will evaluate the stories in terms of
their own interpretive cognitive structure (i.e., schema), not
defendants'.
Think about the sexual assault case. All men on the jury have a
public bathroom schema. That's how we all know what to do when we
walk into a Men's Restroom. The urinal schema has a few very minor
variations depending on whether it's individual urinals or a trough,
manual or automatic flushing, but basically it's the same. You stand
quietly in line, urinate, wash your hands, and leave. In a culture
where most men are a bit uncomfortable about exposing the sexual
portions of their bodies to other men, let alone complete strangers-
some might even say more than a bit uncomfortable, homophobic-
you do not look around at the urinal. You look straight ahead, watch
your own and nobody else's. Every man on the jury (and likely most
of the women) understands this. The notion then of trying to shake
the hand of a neighbor at the adjoining urinal would be literally
Know: Lawyering Expertise, Cognitive Science, and the Functions of Theory, 45 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 313 (1995). See also Mitchell, supra at 275.
93 See Moore, supra note 3, at 276-77, 292.
94 Id. at 295-96.
95 Id. at 277, 303.
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unimaginable. I say literally because try as one might, one could
never conjure that story, pictorial or otherwise, from that set of infor-
mation. And that's not even adding the intense, Western culture bath-
room hygiene schema. Shaking hands with someone who has just
been holding his penis, and, on top of it all, urinating would be sacri-
lege and madness all in one. We simply have no schemata-other
than deliberate vileness, or degeneration in serious measure-which
would make that incident remotely possible, let alone plausible. And
that's assuming fair minded jurors. It doesn't account for jurors who
construct racist, xenophobic stories from the simple pieces of informa-
tion that the defendant is an Asian immigrant who does not speak
English.
The gun is as bad. Though some jurors will have guns at home or
at least have friends who do, their glovebox schema is unlikely to con-
tain an unregistered handgun. It will have maps, Kleenex, registra-
tion, insurance card, tire pressure gauge, car manuals, loose cassette
tapes, brushes and combs. But no handguns. The appearance of a
handgun next to the map instead fits into several likely alternative
schemata-violent and dangerous people, street gangs (when you add
handgun with several young blacks in an older car), criminals looking
for their next mark (when you build a story around the fact the gun
was unregistered), etc. Thus, in addition to the glovebox schema
which makes the client's story highly implausible, there are a series of
other schemata jurors might chose. These not only fit a story of bad
character-i. e., the defendant is just the kind of person to do what he
victim claims he did-but also a story that makes the defendant every-
thing a middle class (generally white) set of jurors fears on the
streets.96 Once cast in that story, the line between whether he did
what is charged and whether he is just simply a dangerous person who
needs to be removed from society will blur.
Again, this reality of "troublesome" stories has implications for
both those espousing client-centered representation and narrative the-
orists. Recently, for example, Professor Miller has called for a collab-
96 This schema-related phenomenon of creating full stories from minimal pieces of in-
formation has been characterized by some as "gap-filling."
Think about the phrases used by this client - "6 o'clock," "car," "driveway," "house,"
"front door," "open," "front steps," "ransacked," "family room." Each of these
terms conjures up an image, but each of these terms is susceptible of many interpre-
tations. Despite the range of interpretation possible and without knowing anything
about the possible parties to this action or even the nature of this case, we have
conjured up in our minds a picture of this woman, her car, her home and her
discovery.
David F. Chavkin, Fuzzy Thinking: A Borrowed Paradigm For Crisper Lawyering, 4 CLN.
L. Rnv. 163, 177 (1997) (footnote omitted).
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oration between client and counsel to create powerful case theories.97
Clients can add a detailed understanding of social, cultural, ethnic and
gender context to the attorney's legally trained skills. Together they
can dynamically push the barriers of traditionally far more static con-
ceptions of case theory.98 I certainly wouldn't quibble with any of
that. It embodies what is surely an excellent set of perceptions. From
the perspective of counsel of two clients whose voices will be heard
but not credited, however, the author's application of her concepts
fails to come to grips with this real problem of narrative credibility,
i.e., believability of the client's voice.
Thus, in her article, the author tells the story of a black client
accused of disturbing the peace, assault, and resisting arrest, all as a
result of a run-in with white security guards while shopping.99 In the
course of analyzing the defense, she creates an elaborate narrative in
which all events are conceptualized through the lens of racism and the
reasonableness of the client's actions assessed accordingly. 100 In fact,
the author tells us, this is not the client's story. The client rejected it
and took a deal. 1 1 Maybe he was unwilling to deal with his case in
terms of racism and his life as a black male janitor, maybe race really
didn't play a defining role. We'll never know. What is significant is
that this rich narrative was obviously compelling to the author, and I
must admit to me too. But is that because it so eloquently unmasked
the "real" story, the true voice? No, I don't think so. Again, we never
know whether this, at any level, reflects the true story. Rather, the
author and I are sucked in because it's just the type of story which
comports with our committed world-view, or schema. It is the arche-
typal story that clinicians at the end of the Twentieth Century in
America-educated, politically appropriate, committed to the op-
pressed-would believe, and eagerly so. Yet, that's the real problem
with telling the client's story and with letting the jury hear the client's
voice. If a jury is not so attuned to the context in which your client's
story arises, you can elucidate that voice all you want, that's easy. But
why should they believe what they hear? That's a little harder.
Public defenders face this all the time. A client accused of grand
theft auto will tell his attorney that he had no idea that the Mercedes
the police stopped him in was stolen. Some man he never met before,
who he knows only as "Red," was sitting next to him at the bar and
started telling him all about his fancy new car. When the defendant
97 Miller, supra note 9, at 564-66, 576.
98 Id. at 527-29.
99 Id. at 529-38.
100 Id. at 542-45.
101 Id. at 538-39, 542.
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said that a car like that must really handle well, Red reached in his
pocket, handed defendant the keys, and told him to give it a spin.
Now, unless the jury believes that there is a world somewhere where
perfect strangers, who you know only by nicknames, just hand over
the keys to fifty thousand dollar automobiles, defendant better take a
deal.102
Likewise, clients often accuse the police of lying. In a DWI case,
the officer is lying about how the client performed on a field sobriety
test. In a possession of crack case, the officer found the drugs in a
trash bin and is now lying about finding it in the client's coat pocket;
it's all racist. Fine, you tell the client. That may well be just what hap-
pened, and, if that's what they want to say to the jury, you'll help
them; but unless there's something really funny about the case, the
officers, and/or the department that you can discover and transpose
into admissible evidence-which generally is highly unlikely-forget
it. The client is going to be found guilty. Is O.J. the exception? No.
First, there was plenty that was "funny" about the evidence, police,
and LAPD that was formally and informally before the jury. Second,
the defendant never testified, never told a story on the stand contra-
dicting the police. Anyway, our two clients are not famous media per-
sonalities. We could put them on the stand and do our best in witness
preparation to anticipate and blunt the inevitable hammering they will
face on cross-examination. But why would we expect a jury to accept
our assault client's story that, for whatever reasons, he thought it was
fine to shake another man's hand while both were urinating; or our
gun client that guns in gloveboxes are as common in his neighborhood
as Kleenex and registration cards in mine? Obviously, we needed
credible information to bolster these central elements of our clients'
stories and thus through education to expand the jurors' evaluative
schemata in a manner which would lead to more positive inferences
for the defendants. 10 3 That to me meant experts.1°4
102 I am not contending that just because a client is a member of a marginalized commu-
nity that it will always be true that everything about that community is different than the
one in which I live, or that the defendant will accurately and honestly report what, from the
point of view of the factfinder, is unique about that community, or that, even granting such
a uniqueness, the particular defendant's behavior was in fact an innocent product of those
unique aspects of that community.
103 See Mitchell, Sixth Amendment, supra note 27, at 1312-13.
104 I am not the first to suggest the possible use of experts in such a situation. Evaluat-
ing Penning's and Hastie's Story Theory study, supra note 86, Professor Lempert com-
ments on one interaction which took place between mock jurors concerning the fact that
the defendant had been carrying a knife.
A major cause of different juror stories is the different background information that
jurors bring to their deliberations. For example, in the mock trial which forms the
basis for much of Pennington and Hastie's story model research, one evening the
defendant, Johnson, carrying a knife, entered a bar frequented by a man, Caldwell,
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IV. USING EXPERTS TO EXPAND THE CONTEXT
Why experts? An expert can add information about the client's
world and culture from which a juror might then draw different infer-
ences from the client's story than would be the case if that story were
solely evaluated by the juror's pre-existing schemata. The new infor-
mation in fact might expand or modify that juror's existing schemata.
In any event, this new information from the expert gives the client's
story a genuine chance of being believed, thus resolving the conflict
between narrative and client-centered representation.
If twenty-five years ago a woman accused of shooting her hus-
band had claimed self-defense in light of repeated and escalating
abuse-even though she never left him, never told the police, never
told family or friends, and never went to a doctor-jurors assessing
that story in the context of their understanding and experience would
have judged it as not making sense and dismissed it as self-serving
fabrication. Times are now different, as we have become increasingly
sensitive to the world of abused women. Yet it is important to recog-
nize that Battered Woman Syndrome is no more than expert infusion
of information which alters the inferences jurors might reasonably
draw from the remaining body of information.l05 Our tactic in the
two cases was similar. Provide information through experts which
would alter the jurors' washroom and glovebox schema/narratives.
Now for the journey from the theoretical reconciliation of my two fa-
vorite theories to the implementation of the resolution in practice.
with whom he had quarreled that afternoon. Middle- and upper-class jurors were
more prone than lower-class jurors to find the defendant guilty of first-degree mur-
der. The reason was that they could construct no story which made sense of the fact
that Johnson was carrying a knife other than the story that he planned a murderous
assault on Caldwell should a confrontation occur. Working- and lower-class jurors
on the other hand found it not only plausible but perhaps likely that a man like
Johnson would carry a knife wherever he went for general protection. Indeed, in one
filmed deliberation of this trial that I observed, a woman juror, arguing that the pres-
ence of a knife carried with it no sinister implications, stated that she probably had a
knife in her pocketbook at that very moment.
Richard Lempert, Telling Tales in Court: Trial Procedure And The Story Model, 13 CAR-
DOZO L. REv. 559, 571 (1991). Professor Lempert then goes on to posit that in theory
some experts could qualify under Fed. R. Evid. 702 to be able to explain to the factfinder
that "people of defendant's social background regularly carry knives." Id. at 571. Cf also
White, supra note 30, at 55 ("Bennett and Feldman suggest the use of expert witnesses to
educate juries about the risk that they might discredit testimony because of social barriers
encoded into a witness's speech [footnote omitted]."). Note: Professor White suggests a
number of possible other solutions to the problem of powerless speech which take the form
of institutional and structural changes. Id. at 55-56.
105 In fact, this perspective of the battered woman is now so much a part of our culture,
that I've actually seen prosecutors try to imply that.the fact that the victim did not call the
police or tell anyone leads to the inference that she is "a classic battered woman," and,
therefore, defendant is guilty. Q.E.D.
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Based on the initial discussions with our Asian client, we thus
sought an expert who could say that men from his culture, even when
transplanted to this culture, are far less conscious about showing their
bodies to other men than are most American males, and that within
this set of cultural values almost certainly unfamiliar to the jury, at-
tempting to shake the hand of someone you know as you both urinate
is plausible. Fine. The next problem was to find such an expert, and
that took until a few days before trial. As people trained in graduate
schools ourselves, we naturally looked to academia. For weeks, the
students tried to locate Asian experts in the defendant's culture from
the surrounding colleges and universities. But this didn't work. First,
only one professor really had any expertise on this aspect of the cul-
ture, and he was unwilling to give us any real time, let alone testify.
Second, even if he had been willing, I do not believe his opinion would
have held much weight after cross-examination. The professor was an
expert on values in a particular Asian country. Our client, however,
was no longer in that country. He had been living here for five years in
an enclave. In short, we needed an expert on the values of the 6migr6s
of the client's country living in enclaves in the Pacific Northwest.
Two days prior to trial, the students found our expert, interview-
ing him by phone. He was out of town but said he was returning the
next day and agreed to meet with the students during lunch hour of
the first day of trial. That cut it rather close, but we had no real
choice. He was perfect. The expert was a native of defendant's coun-
try who had lived in the same enclave as our client since our expert's
arrival in America fifteen years ago. He was very articulate. In the
enclave, he taught English as a second language and headed a pro-
gram on assimilation skills. In order to run this program, he needed to
understand the experience of an 6migrd in the enclave, American cul-
tural values, work expectations of local employers, traditional cultural
values of his native country, and the traditional values which are re-
tained by those in the enclave even when in the wider American cul-
ture. In his opinion, our client would retain those traditional values
which make men in his culture unselfconscious about displaying their
bodies before other men. Thus, in the expert's opinion, the client's
story is entirely plausible.
In the gun case, we needed an expert who could testify that, in
the defendant's world, it was very common for people to carry hand-
guns in their cars. This testimony would undermine the inference that
it would be implausible for the defendant to be identified, and to be
sitting in front of a glove compartment holding a gun, and yet never-
theless be the wrong man. The problem, again, was to find our expert.
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This took some creativity. Police were naturals, 10 6 but realistically not
available to our side. The local police were assisting in the prosecu-
tion; police from other jurisdictions were hardly going to come into
the local court to assist the opponents of their fellow police.
We eventually located the "Safe Streets" (a community block
watch and crime prevention organization) coordinator for the area in
which the defendant lived. A middle-aged mom, PTA president, and
worker in the "Safe Streets" project for seven years, we believed that
her knowledge and experience qualified her to speak' 0 7 about the ac-
cess to and possession of handguns in defendant's community as a re-
sponse to crime and violence. She explained to us that a "community"
can be a few square blocks or several miles, and that even adjacent
poorer minority communities a few blocks apart can have very differ-
ent customs, practices, behaviors, and expectations.10 8 She had
worked in defendant's community for the past three years, meeting in
the community with residents or neighborhood organizations at least
three days a week, and had phone conversations with community
members several hours each day. She was willing to testify that be-
cause of fear of crime and drug gangs, many residents carry handguns
on their persons and in their cars. While most of the guns -are licensed
(again, the one in the car in which defendant was a passenger was not
licensed), a significant number are not. So, we found our two experts.
106 To the extent that the police subscribe to a true "community policing" model, their
knowledge of the practices and behaviors of those in their communities would likely be
even keener. See generally Dennis P. Rosenbaum, The Theory and Research Behind Neigh-
borhood Watch: Is It a Sound Fear and Crime Reduction Strategy?, 33 CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY 103 (1986); Peter K. Manning, Community Policing, 3 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
POLICE 205 (1984). See also V. A. Tomovich & D. J. Loree, In Search of New Directions:
Policing in Niagara Region, 13 CANADIAN POLICE JOURNAL 29, 48-49 (1989) (explores
different notions embodied in concept of "community policing"). See also James Q. Wilson
& George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY 29 (March, 1982).
107 An expert witness may be qualified by "knowledge, skill, [or], experience..." FED.
R. EVID. 702.
108 Once a "community" is no longer equated with a formal political unit or sub-unit,
drawing exact boundaries is no longer obvious or easy. For example, the "Communities
That Care" program of community mobilization to prevent drug and alcohol abuse pro-
vides the following broad parameters:
Several kinds of communities may choose to use the "Communities That Care" strat-
egy. For example, a city, a neighborhood within a city, a high school and the schools
that feed into it, a small town, a rural county, or a Native American community can
use the strategy. The most important requirement is that the community be a clearly
defined geographical area and identified as a community by people who live and
work there. The smaller and more clearly defined the community, the more effec-
tively it can be mobilized. Larger and more geographically dispersed communities
are more difficult to mobilize, but the community must be large enough to have
access to the resources to successfully implement their strategy.
J. DAVID HAWKINS, RICHARD F. CATALANO JR., AND AsSOCIATES, COMMUNITIES THAT
CARE 25-26 (1992).
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That was a third of the battle. Gaining admissibility and then convey-
ing their information in a convincing manner to the jury to support the
inferences we wanted the jury to draw was the rest.
In the trial briefs we had been revising until late the night before
trial, we characterized the experts as "experts on the defendant's
world."'10 9 Interestingly, this type of expert is very common, although
not for the defense.110 Consistently, police, FBI agents, and such are
allowed to enlighten the jury about a variety of criminal "worlds"-
car thieves,"' gangs both in prison 12 and on the streets, 113 drug deal-
ers,114 drug users," l 5 prostitutes," 6 panderers,"l 7 purveyors of illegal
gambling, 118 runaways,"l9 shoplifters, 120 "till-tappers,'' 1El pickpock-
ets,122 con men,123 and burglars.124 This expertise can in fact be as
109 Similarly, in Immigration Law, one must be prepared to present information to the
Immigration Judge explaining cross-cultural behavior in order to prevent the judge from
drawing incorrect inferences (for example, the fact a Guatemalan highland Indian does not
have a particular date in mind correlating to each significant event in his case does not
mean he is not telling the truth). See VERONICA KoTr, THE IMPACr OF CULTURAL FAC-
TORS ON CREDIBILITY IN ASYLUM CONTESTS (1988).
110 State v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (ordered not published) is the
rare exception. There the court found the murder defendant (accused of killing her child
after attempting suicide) was entitled to transcultural psychologists and an instruction that
her culture could be considered as it bore upon the relevant mental states. Id. at 883, 884,
886. In fact to say that legal recognition of such defense experts is the rare exception is
really under-statement since the Wu court could find no other appellate authority on the
subject. Id. at 882.
111 See State v. Oldaker, 304 S.E.2d 843 (W. Va. 1983).
112 See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
113 See People v. McDaniels, 166 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1994).
114 See, e.g., State v. Berry, 658 A.2d 702 (N.J. 1995); United States v. McDonald, 933
F.2d 1519 (10th Cir., 1991); United States v. Dawson, 555 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Pa., 1982);
State v. Salazar, 557 P.2d 552 (1976); Benefield v. State, 232 S.E.2d 89 (1976). A minority
of courts have attempted to curb this form of expert testimony about the "world" of drug
dealers either under the rationale that the jury does not need the testimony because the
information is obvious, United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir. 1991), or devaluing
testimony on the "ultimate fact" of intent to distribute (vs. personal possession) when evi-
dence ambiguous, United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1991), or by finding
the testimony to be forbidden "profile evidence," People v. Martinez, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838
(1992).
115 See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451-52 & n.6 (7th Cir. 1991); State v. Re-
liford, 343 So. 2d 1376 (La. 1977).
116 See People v. Crooks, 59 Cal. Rptr. 39 (1967).
117 See State v. Simon, 831 P.2d 139 (1991); State v. McCray, 327 So. 2d 408 (La. 1975).
118 See United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979); Moore v. United States, 394
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1030 (1969); United States v. Barletta, 565
F.2d 985 (8th Cir. 1977).
119 See Rodriguez v. State, 741 P.2d 1206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
120 See Hooks v. United States, 373 A.2d 909 (D.C. App. 1977); State v. Woods, 487
P.2d 666 (Or. App. 1971).
121 See People v. Clay, 38 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1964).
122 See United States v. Jackson, 425 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
123 See State v. Tucker, 567 P.2d 1089 (Or. App. 1977); United States v. Stull, 521 F.2d
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specific to a particular community as drug dealing in New Orleans,
Louisiana, 125 or the use of narcotics paraphernalia in Durham, North
Carolina.126 Why should the result be any different with our ex-
perts? 127 This is especially so in a criminal case where rejection pre-
vents the defendant from effectively presenting his case and arguably
even interferes with his right to testify (i.e., why take the stand to tell a
story the jury won't believe?). Of course, my rhetorical questions did
not ensure that the judge would both accept our theory and find our
witnesses qualified. What we were attempting was likely to appear
both unusual in terms of the judge's and prosecutor's common experi-
ence (i.e., these are unusual defense experts presenting an unusual ex-
pertise) and important to the outcome of the case. The combination of
unusual and important always guarantees a real fight, and a fight in
which you cannot confidentially predict the outcome.
In fact, the showdown never came. Our expert for the sexual as-
sault case called the first evening of trial. He was out of state on a
family emergency and would not be back for several weeks. Because
the students had never met him in person, with their contact being
limited to a series of telephone conversations, they had never subpoe-
naed the expert. No subpoena, no continuance in spite of the
thoughtful argument the student's made for the record. So we went to
trial without the expert. In the end, the client did not take the stand
and the students raised the reasonable doubt defense. The jury came
back with an acquittal. Our expert on the gun case showed up, but the
state's main witness did not. The case was dismissed. Pretty anticli-
matic ...
V. EPILOGUE
Trials are funny animals. With all the strategic preparation and
analysis we put into telling "the client's story," in the end neither cli-
687 (6th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976); Commonwealth v. Townsend, 27
A.2d 462 (Pa. Super. 1942).
124 See State v. Gervais, 394 A.2d 1183 (Mo. 1978).
125 See State v. Carter, 347 So. 2d 236 (La. 1977).
126 See State v. Covington, 206 S.E.2d 361 (N.C. App. 1974).
127 In a sense, such defense experts really serve the function of storytellers, telling sto-
ries of a particular community. Taking a similar storyteller role were the FBI agents who
told tales of gamblers, till-tappers, and junkies. In some strange way, these "community"
experts bring the jury back toward that time in the early history of the system when jurors
knew the community and players in full, rich context. Maybe too full and rich, because we
traded them for a "neutral/unbiased" jury in the sense that they did not personally know
the context. The problem seems to be that we have become so dispersed and fragmented
into subcultures and subcommunities that the factfinder is ignorant of the world-contexts
in which the incidents they are reviewing arose; i.e., the very type of knowledge they need
to assess case narrative, and the very type of knowledge early juries possessed to the hilt.
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ent's was told. The sexual assault client did not take the stand and,
instead, raised a reasonable doubt defense. Of course, the handgun
defendant never got near the stand as his case was dismissed at the
eleventh hour. I wonder though whether, if it had come down to it, we
would have gotten in either expert's testimony. The expert on the im-
migrant enclave seemed to have more traditional credentials and be
speaking on a more traditional subject than the expert in the handgun
case. In the latter case, the Judge might well have been uneasy about
sanctioning "experts" who are testifying about the customs and prac-
tices of specific two-block areas in the city (although there is a sense in
which our particular young black defendant likewise lived in an en-
clave of sorts). The Judge might have intuitively feared that such testi-
mony will become commonplace and routinely put jurors in the
position of facing an expert telling them that, "nothing you under-
stand about the world pertains, because this event did not take place
in your neighborhood.' 1 28 But who knows? Maybe the Judge would
have been influenced by the legitimacy of an opinion voiced by a
spokesperson of what is at its core a crime prevention organization.
No matter how many times I turn it over in my head, I don't know.
And, if the judge had let the expert testimony, what would the jury
have thought? Again, I didn't know. I will, however, find out some
day. Because I do know that with all the procedural safeguards in the
world,129 unless diverse defendants can tell their stories to the
factfinders without being saddled with credibility problems touching
critical story elements of their narratives that are due, not to the sto-
ries, but to the schemata of the factfinders, this group of defendants
cannot receive a "fair trial." Yet, what is the solution? How do you
convince a jury, to whom a defendant's world is foreign and even fan-
tastic, that it really exists as your client is claiming? Finding experts
proved very difficult and time consuming in our two cases, and ulti-
mately unsuccessful in the sexual assault case. Surely this effort is not
realistic for public defenders who handle most cases involving these
128 Professor Lempert expressed a similar concern:
Expert testimony on such background issues as whether people of the defendant's
social class regularly carry knives is , in theory, allowed under FRE 702, because the
rule provides that "specialized knowledge" from experts is admissible if it will "assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence." In practice, however, the admissibility
of such evidence is largely discretionary with the judge, and many judges are reluc-
tant to allow experts to testify to "what ordinary people know." The problem is that
ordinary people know different things about the same subject matter, yet they may
believe that everyone "knows" what they do.
Lempert, supra note 104, at 571.
129 A similar notion is expressed in Professor White's Sunday Shoes piece as she ex-
plores the limitations of "formal procedural equality" when representing clients who are
outsiders, subordinated, etc. See White, supra note 30, at 2-3.
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diverse defendants. What then is available beyond the scattered, infre-
quent efforts of individual attorneys? Perhaps the public defender and
defense bar in general need to develop a panel of volunteer or court-
compensated experts 130 who can describe the "worlds" of their clients
for jurors. Certainly, issues would arise as to the bias of panel mem-
bers ("so you only testify for the defense.... In fact, you know defen-
dant's family .... ) as well as their possible use by the prosecution or
development of a prosecution counter-panel. 3 1 So be it. At least it
would give these defendants a fair chance to have their stories really
heard by a jury. And that's all most of them ask for. It would also
help allay the anxiety of a true believer to see his beloved theories of
narrative and client "voice" become a harmonious whole once again.
130 States generally have statutory bases to obtain compensation for expert witness, as
well as constitutional grounding. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). See also John
F. Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statu-
tory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CiNN. L. REv. 574 (1982). But see David A. Harris, Ake
Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV.
763 (1990).
131 In fact, in People v. Wu, 286 Cal. Rptr. 868, 880 (1991), the prosecution did put on a
counterexpert who "noted that nothing in Chinese culture or religion encourages filicide."
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